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Peace, War, and the Balance of Power

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  • Wagner, R. Harrison

Abstract

Every possible relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war has been defended somewhere in the literature on international politics: war is least likely if power is distributed equally, war is least likely if power is distributed unequally, and the distribution of power has no effect on the likelihood of war. I try to settle this dispute by examining the effect of expectations about the outcome of war on the choice between war and negotiation. I argue that each of these mutually contradictory propositions can be derived from some plausible set of premises and thus that which one is correct depends on which set of premises best describes a situation. The most important factors affecting the relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war are (1) whether the terms of a compromise agreement that might be accepted in lieu of war affect the distribution of power between the antagonists and therefore the probability that the agreement will be enforced and (2) how many states' interests will be affected by the outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Wagner, R. Harrison, 1994. "Peace, War, and the Balance of Power," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(3), pages 593-607, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:88:y:1994:i:03:p:593-607_09
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2009. "Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 191, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    2. Changxia Ke & Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2015. "Alliances In The Shadow Of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(2), pages 854-871, April.
    3. Herbst, Luisa & Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2017. "Balance of power and the propensity of conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 168-184.
    4. Alastair Smith, 1998. "Fighting Battles, Winning Wars," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(3), pages 301-320, June.
    5. Schaller, Zachary & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2020. "Bargaining and conflict with up-front investments: How power asymmetries matter," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 212-225.
    6. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2016. "Evolutionary determinants of war," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(4), pages 520-534, August.
    7. Eguia, Jon X., 2022. "Multilateral regime change," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    8. Donald Wittman, 2009. "Bargaining in the Shadow of War: When Is a Peaceful Resolution Most Likely?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(3), pages 588-602, July.
    9. Ernesto Dal Bó & Robert Powell, 2009. "A Model of Spoils Politics," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 207-222, January.
    10. Nikitas Konstantinidis, 2020. "Military conscription, external security, and income inequality: The missing link," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 312-347, April.
    11. Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2004. "Conflict as a Part of the Bargaining Process: Theory and Empirical Evidence," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 129, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    12. Kristopher W. Ramsay, 2008. "Settling It on the Field," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(6), pages 850-879, December.

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