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Discontent and the Expected Utility of Rebellion: The Case of Peru

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  • Muller, Edward N.
  • Dietz, Henry A.
  • Finkel, Steven E.

Abstract

Discontent theories of rebellion postulate that politicized discontent will have a strong independent effect on individuals' potential to participate in rebellious political action. Expected utility theories postulate that participation in rebellious action is motivated by expectation of reward and that discontent is relevant at most only insofar as individuals expect that collective action can be successful and that their participation is important to that end. We test these theories with data from a national sample and a sample of students at a protest-prone university in Peru, a country with significant objective conditions of discontent and a high incidence of rebellious political conflict. The results provide no evidence for the discontent models but strong support for the expected utility models. The potential for participation in rebellious political action proves to be a function primarily of discontent weighted by the expectancy of the action's success and the perceived importance of personal participation. Private social and normative rewards and costs also are relevant—but to a lesser extent—for the individual's calculation of the expected utility of participation.

Suggested Citation

  • Muller, Edward N. & Dietz, Henry A. & Finkel, Steven E., 1991. "Discontent and the Expected Utility of Rebellion: The Case of Peru," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(4), pages 1261-1282, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:85:y:1991:i:04:p:1261-1282_18
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    Cited by:

    1. Edward N. Muller & Erich Weede, 1994. "Theories of Rebellion," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(1), pages 40-57, January.
    2. Michael Hechter, 1994. "The Role of Values in Rational Choice Theory," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(3), pages 318-333, July.
    3. Iain Hampsher‐Monk & Andrew Hindmoor, 2010. "Rational Choice and Interpretive Evidence: Caught between a Rock and a Hard Place?," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 58(1), pages 47-65, February.
    4. Dae Jin Yi, 2012. "No taxation, no democracy? Taxation, income inequality, and democracy," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 15(2), pages 71-92.
    5. Lawrence A. Kuznar & James M. Lutz, 2007. "Risk Sensitivity and Terrorism," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 55(2), pages 341-361, June.
    6. Meirav Mishali-Ram & Jonathan Fox, 2022. "Is governmental and societal discrimination against Muslim minorities behind foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq?," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 59(2), pages 122-135, March.
    7. Yung Yau, 2018. "Tripartite Efficacy Beliefs and Homeowner Participation in Multi-Owned Housing Governance," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(9), pages 1-17, September.
    8. Yi Feng & Paul J. Zak, 1999. "The Determinants of Democratic Transitions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 43(2), pages 162-177, April.
    9. Christopher Blattman, 2008. "From Violence to Voting: War and political participation in Uganda," Working Papers 138, Center for Global Development.
    10. Peter J. Phillips & Gabriela Pohl, 2021. "Crowd counting: a behavioural economics perspective," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 55(6), pages 2253-2270, December.
    11. Tor Georg Jakobsen & Indra De Soysa & Jo Jakobsen, 2013. "Why do poor countries suffer costly conflict? Unpacking per capita income and the onset of civil war," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 30(2), pages 140-160, April.
    12. Ravi Bhavnani & Michael Ross, 2003. "Announcement, Credibility, and Turnout in Popular Rebellions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 47(3), pages 340-366, June.

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