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Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements

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  • KELLEY, JUDITH

Abstract

What do countries do when they have committed to a treaty, but then find that commitment challenged? After the creation of the International Criminal Court, the United States tried to get countries, regardless of whether they were parties to the Court or not, to sign agreements not to surrender Americans to the Court. Why did some states sign and others not? Given United States power and threats of military sanctions, some states did sign. However, such factors tell only part of the story. When refusing to sign, many states emphasized the moral value of the court. Further, states with a high domestic rule of law emphasized the importance of keeping their commitment. This article therefore advances two classic arguments that typically are difficult to substantiate; namely, state preferences are indeed partly normative, and international commitments do not just screen states; they also constrain.

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  • Kelley, Judith, 2007. "Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(3), pages 573-589, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:101:y:2007:i:03:p:573-589_07
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    Cited by:

    1. Wade Jacoby & Gabriel Lataianu & Camelia Lataianu, 2009. "Success in slow motion: The Europeanization of Romanian child protection policy," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 111-133, June.
    2. Michael W. Toffel & Jodi L. Short & Melissa Ouellet, 2012. "Codes in Context: How States, Markets, and Civil Society Shape Adherence to Global Labor Standards," Harvard Business School Working Papers 13-045, Harvard Business School, revised Sep 2014.
    3. Catherine Z. Worsnop, 2017. "Domestic politics and the WHO’s International Health Regulations: Explaining the use of trade and travel barriers during disease outbreaks," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 365-395, September.
    4. Sara Kahn-Nisser, 2021. "For better or worse: Shaming, faming, and human rights abuse," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(3), pages 479-493, May.
    5. Rebecca Cordell, 2021. "The Political Costs of Abusing Human Rights: International Cooperation in Extraordinary Rendition," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 65(2-3), pages 255-282, February.
    6. Lisa Martin, 2008. "Xinyuan Dai, International Institutions and National Policies," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 201-206, June.
    7. Benjamin Goldsmith & Yusaku Horiuchi, 2011. "In Search of Soft Power: Does Foreign Public Opinion Matter for U.S. Foreign Policy," Crawford School Research Papers 1108, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    8. Asif Efrat & Abraham L Newman, 2020. "Defending core values: Human rights and the extradition of fugitives," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(4), pages 581-596, July.
    9. A. Burcu Bayram & Erin R. Graham, 2017. "Financing the United Nations: Explaining variation in how donors provide funding to the UN," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 421-459, September.
    10. Erik Voeten, 2014. "Does participation in international organizations increase cooperation?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 285-308, September.
    11. Nicole De Silva, 2017. "Intermediary Complexity in Regulatory Governance," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 670(1), pages 170-188, March.
    12. James Meernik & Kimi King, 2014. "A psychological jurisprudence model of public opinion and international prosecution," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 17(1), pages 3-20, March.
    13. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Jana von Stein & Erik Gartzke, 2008. "International Organizations Count," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(2), pages 175-188, April.

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