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Treaty withdrawal and the development of international law

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  • Averell Schmidt

    (Harvard University John F Kennedy School of Government)

Abstract

I argue that treaty withdrawal has two opposing effects on the development of international law. First, it directly impacts the treaty where it occurs by pushing the remaining members to adopt reforms to maintain cooperation. Second, it indirectly affects the development of other treaties by damaging diplomatic relations between the withdrawing state and other members, hindering negotiations in other areas of cooperation. Consequentially, treaty withdrawal has a mixed impact on the development of international law: it expedites the reform of one treaty while inhibiting reform elsewhere. I test this argument by applying a difference-in-differences design to an original panel of treaties built from the records of the United Nations. My findings reveal that while withdrawal increases the number of reforms in treaties where it occurs, it decreases reforms in similar treaties with comparable memberships. The indirect effect more than cancels out the direct effect. Overall, treaty withdrawal impedes the creation of new international laws.

Suggested Citation

  • Averell Schmidt, 2024. "Treaty withdrawal and the development of international law," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 785-808, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:19:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s11558-024-09553-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-024-09553-4
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