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Government Deficits, Political Inefficiency, and Fiscal Reconstruction in Japan

Author

Listed:
  • Takero Doi

    (Faculty of Economics, Keio University
    Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California)

  • Toshihiro Ihori

    (Department of Economics, University of Tokyo)

  • Hiroki Kondo

    (Department of Econmics, Shinshu University)

Abstract

We investigate the behavior of government deficits and fiscal reconstruction movement in Japan both theoretically and empirically. We first develop a dynamic framework of fiscal reconstruction process using the dynamic game theory among various interest groups. The distribution of a tax increase, that is, contribution of taxes to reducing public debt and raising privileges, depends on the political efficiency of lobbying activities. We also investigate empirically the relationship between the political inefficiency and the outcome of fiscal reconstruction process in the Japanese (national) general account.

Suggested Citation

  • Takero Doi & Toshihiro Ihori & Hiroki Kondo, 2002. "Government Deficits, Political Inefficiency, and Fiscal Reconstruction in Japan," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 3(1), pages 169-183, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2002:v:3:i:1:p:169-183
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ihori, Toshihiro & Itaya, Jun-ichi, 2001. "A dynamic model of fiscal reconstruction," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 779-797, November.
    2. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
    3. Becker, Gary S & Mulligan, Casey B, 2003. "Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 293-340, October.
    4. Boadway, Robin & Pestieau, Pierre & Wildasin, David, 1989. "Tax-transfer policies and the voluntary provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 157-176, July.
    5. Andres Velasco, 1997. "A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms," NBER Working Papers 6336, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. V. V. Chari & Harold L. Cole, 1993. "Why are representative democracies fiscally irresponsible?," Staff Report 163, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Doi, Takero & Ihori, Toshihiro, 2002. "Fiscal Reconstruction and Local Interest Groups in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 492-511, December.
    2. Denis Nitikin & Chunli Shen & Qian Wang & Heng-fu Zou, 2011. "Land Taxation in China: Assessment of Prospects for Politically and Economically Sustainable Reform," CEMA Working Papers 431, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
    3. Denis Nitikin & Chunli Shen & Qian Wang & Heng-fu Zou, 2012. "Water Service Delivery Reform in China: Safeguarding the Interests of the Poor," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 13(2), pages 463-487, November.
    4. Heng-fu Zou, 2011. "Foreign Asset Accumulation and Macroeconomic Policies in a Model of Mercantilism," CEMA Working Papers 432, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Government deficits; Fiscal reconstruction; Political inefficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
    • H80 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - General

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