Antitrust and Insurance: Should the McCarran Act Be Repealed?
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- Baumol, William J & Ordover, Janusz A, 1985. "Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 247-265, May.
- Frech, H E, III & Samprone, Joseph C, Jr, 1980. "The Welfare Loss of Excess Nonprice Competition: The Case of Property-Liability Insurance Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 429-440, October.
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JEL classification:
- R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
- Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General
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