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Is deflation trap a serious threat? Case study of FED, ECB and NBP

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  • Maciej Ryczkowski

    (Nicolaus Copernicus University)

Abstract

The goal of the paper is to compare nonstandard solutions implemented by Federal Reserve System, European Central Bank and National Bank of Poland in response to the outbreak of a subrime crisis in United States and to debt crisis in European Union. For that purpose there is carried out a comparative, descriptive analysis of institutional steps taken by the three central banks and the governments to preserve macroeconomic stability. The nonstandard measures allowed to avoid a comeback of the Great Depression and restored market’s confidence, unfortunately at the cost of decreased resilience for future possible crises along with many other medium and long run unintended consequences.

Suggested Citation

  • Maciej Ryczkowski, 2015. "Is deflation trap a serious threat? Case study of FED, ECB and NBP," Ekonomia i Prawo, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 14(2), pages 243-259, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpn:umkeip:v:14:y:2015:i:2:p:243-259
    DOI: 10.12775/EiP.2015.015
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    nonstandard monetary policy measures; deflation trap; liquidity trap;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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