¿Importa la independencia? el caso del Banco Central colombiano
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Rudiger Dornbusch & Sebastian Edwards, 1991.
"The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America,"
NBER Books,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number dorn91-1.
- Dornbusch, Rudiger & Edwards, Sebastian, 1989. "The macroeconomics of populism in Latin America," Policy Research Working Paper Series 316, The World Bank.
- Burdekin, Richard C. K., 1987.
"Cross-country evidence on the relationship between central banks and governments,"
Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 391-405.
- Richard C. K. Burdekin, 1986. "Cross-country evidence on the relationship between central banks and governments," Working Papers 8603, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
- Rudolf Hommes, 1998. "Evolución y racionalidad de las instituciones presupuestales en Colombia," Coyuntura Económica, Fedesarrollo, March.
- Miguel Urrutia, 1991. "On the Absence of Economic Populism in Colombia," NBER Chapters, in: The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America, pages 369-391, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
- Cukierman Alex, 1992. "CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE: Compte Rendu par Dominique Cariofillo," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 581-590, December.
- Rudiger Dornbusch & Sebastian Edwards, 1991. "The Macroeconomics of Populism," NBER Chapters, in: The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America, pages 7-13, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Adolfo Meisel R., 1996. "Why No Hyperinflation In Colombia? On The Determinants Of Stable Economic Policies," Borradores de Economia 3780, Banco de la Republica.
- Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-167, March.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Akhand Akhtar Hossain, 2009. "Central Banking and Monetary Policy in the Asia-Pacific," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12777.
- Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2018. "Beyond the Central Bank Independence Veil: New Evidence," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1871, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Francesca Castellani & Xavier Debrun, 2005. "Designing Macroeconomic Frameworks: A Positive Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Delegation," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 87-117, March.
- Martin, Fernando M., 2015.
"Debt, inflation and central bank independence,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 129-150.
- Fernando Martin, 2012. "Debt, Inflation and Central Bank Independence," 2012 Meeting Papers 1019, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Fernando M. Martin, 2013. "Debt, inflation and central bank independence," Working Papers 2013-017, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Lars P Feld & Volker Wieland, 2021.
"The German Federal Constitutional Court Ruling and the European Central Bank’s Strategy,"
Journal of Financial Regulation, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 217-253.
- Wieland, Volker & Feld, Lars, 2020. "The German Federal Constitutional Court Ruling and the European Central Bank's Strategy," CEPR Discussion Papers 15320, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Feld, Lars P. & Wieland, Volker, 2020. "The German Federal Constitutional Court ruling and the European Central Bank's strategy," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 20/5, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
- Feld, Lars P. & Wieland, Volker, 2020. "The German Federal Constitutional Court ruling and the European Central Bank's strategy," IMFS Working Paper Series 145, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
- Berthold Herrendorf & Manfred J.M. Neumann, 2003.
"The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(484), pages 43-64, January.
- Herrendorf, Berthold & Neumann, Manfred J.M., 1998. "The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence," CEPR Discussion Papers 1969, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Athanasios Papadopoulos & Giuseppe Diana & Moise Sidiropoulos, 2005. "Central Bank Reform and Inflation Dynamics in the Transition Economies theory and some evidence," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 58, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
- Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015.
"Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics,"
Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
- Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2015. "Ups and Downs. Central Bank Independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: Theory, Institutions and Empirics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1503, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Marco Lossani & Piergiovanna Natale & Patrizio Tirelli, 1997. "Fiscal Policy and Imperfectly Credible Targets: Should We Appoint Expenditure-Conservative Central Bankers?," Working Papers 06, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 1997.
- J. De Haan & F. Amtenbrink & S.C.W. Eijffinger, 1999.
"Accountability of central banks: aspects and quantification,"
BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 52(209), pages 169-193.
- J. De Haan & F. Amtenbrink & S.C.W. Eijffinger, 1999. "Accountability of central banks: aspects and quantification," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 52(209), pages 169-193.
- de Haan, J. & Amtenbrink, F. & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1998. "Accountability of Central Banks : Aspects and Quantification," Other publications TiSEM 51661f17-9a86-4fde-9ab5-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- de Haan, J. & Amtenbrink, F. & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1998. "Accountability of Central Banks : Aspects and Quantification," Discussion Paper 1998-54, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999.
"Political economics and macroeconomic policy,"
Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482,
Elsevier.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Working Papers 121, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Papers 630, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," NBER Working Papers 6329, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini , Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Seminar Papers 630, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1759, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Helge Berger & Ulrich Woitek, "undated".
"Does Conservatism Matter? A Time Series Approach to Central Banking,"
Working Papers
9814, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, revised May 1999.
- Helge Berger & Ulrich Woitek, 1999. "Does Conservatism Matter? A Time Series Approach to Central Banking," CESifo Working Paper Series 190, CESifo.
- Marco Lossani & Piergiovanna Natale & Patrizio Tirelli, 2001.
"Fiscal Policy and Inflation Targets: Does Credibility Matter?,"
Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 371-392.
- Lossani, Marco & Natale, Piergiovanna & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2000. "Fiscal Policy and Inflation Targets: Does Credibility Matters?," MPRA Paper 18693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Maxime Menuet & Hugo Oriola & Patrick Villieu, 2024.
"Do conservative central bankers weaken the chances of conservative politicians?,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 62(4), pages 681-738, June.
- Maxime Menuet & Hugo Oriola & Patrick Villieu, 2021. "Do Conservative Central Bankers Weaken the Chances of Conservative Politicians?," Working Papers hal-03479411, HAL.
- Francisco Rosende, 1997. "La Autonomía del Banco Central una Vez Más," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 34(101), pages 3-26.
- Ahmad Bhat Aijaz & Iqbal Khan Javaid & Ahmad Bhat Sajad & Ahmad Parray Waseem, 2023. "Central Bank Independence and its Impact on Fiscal Deficit: Evidence from India," Studia Universitatis „Vasile Goldis” Arad – Economics Series, Sciendo, vol. 33(2), pages 71-94, June.
- Goodhart, C. A. E. & Huang, Haizhou, 1995. "What is the Central Bank's game?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119176, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Jorge Ponce, 2010.
"A Normative Analysis of Banking Supervision: Independence, Legal Protection and Accountability,"
Money Affairs, CEMLA, vol. 0(2), pages 141-181, July-Dece.
- Jorge Ponce, 2008. "A Normative Analysis of Banking Supervision: Independence, Legal Protection and Accountability," Documentos de trabajo 2008006, Banco Central del Uruguay, revised 21 Oct 2010.
- Frederic S. Mishkin & Niklas J. Westelius, 2008.
"Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contracts,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(4), pages 557-582, June.
- Frederic S. Mishkin & Niklas J. Westelius, 2008. "Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contracts," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(4), pages 557-582, June.
- Frederic S. Mishkin & Niklas J. Westelius, 2006. "Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contracts," NBER Working Papers 12384, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Niklas J. Westelius & Frederic S. Mishkin, 2006. "Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contracts," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 416, Hunter College Department of Economics.
- Alex Cukierman & Stefan Gerlach, 2003.
"The inflation bias revisited: theory and some international evidence,"
Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 71(5), pages 541-565, September.
- Cukierman, Alex & Gerlach, Stefan, 2003. "The Inflation Bias Revisited: Theory and Some International Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 3761, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
More about this item
Keywords
Informes de Investigación; Independencia de los Bancos Centrales; Bancos Centrales; Junta Monetaria; Junta Directiva; Inflación; Tasa de Interés; Crecimiento Económico; Autonomía de la Banca Central; Colombia;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- O47 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence
- E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
- E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000438:013508. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Patricia Monroy (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fedesco.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.