IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/col/000411/018502.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

[Documento] Controlling Shareholders and Contract Theory: A Review of Literature

Author

Listed:
  • Roberto Fortich Mesa

Abstract

In this survey I succinctly review the contract theory literature on the rebellious manager type of agency conflict. Freedom of enterprise, private property, and the incentives of businessmen to make profits are essential values of the capitalist economic system. When economic institutions that preserve these values are in place, capital circulates, businesses invest and the economy grows. Just as prices do not need to be intervened for markets to work, capital too can work when left alone: savings are transformed into investments, prospects of future cash flows are taken at present value, and small-investor distrust is overcome even in the face of unfamiliar risky enterprises.

Suggested Citation

  • Roberto Fortich Mesa, 2018. "[Documento] Controlling Shareholders and Contract Theory: A Review of Literature," Revista Economía y Región, Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar, vol. 12(1), pages 157-162, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000411:018502
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://revistas.utb.edu.co/index.php/economiayregion/article/view/192
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 678-689, May.
    2. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    3. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    4. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(1), pages 3-35.
    5. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
    6. Gutierrez, Luis H. & Pombo, Carlos & Taborda, Rodrigo, 2008. "Ownership and control in Colombian corporations," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 22-47, February.
    7. Jean Tirole, 2006. "The Theory of Corporate Finance," Post-Print hal-00173191, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Christian Engelen, 2015. "The effects of managerial discretion on moral hazard related behaviour: German evidence on agency costs," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 19(4), pages 927-960, November.
    2. Tristan Auvray & Olivier Brossard, 2012. "Too Dispersed to Monitor? Ownership Dispersion, Monitoring, and the Prediction of Bank Distress," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(4), pages 685-714, June.
    3. Dietrich, Diemo & Jindra, Björn, 2010. "Corporate governance in the multinational enterprise: A financial contracting perspective," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 446-456, October.
    4. Gur Aminadav & Elias Papaioannou, 2020. "Corporate Control around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(3), pages 1191-1246, June.
    5. David B. Audretsch & Erik E. Lehmann, 2013. "Corporate governance in newly listed companies," Chapters, in: Mario Levis & Silvio Vismara (ed.), Handbook of Research on IPOs, chapter 9, pages 179-206, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Gregorio Sánchez‐Marín & María Encarnación Lucas‐Pérez & Samuel Baixauli‐Soler & Brian G.M. Main & Antonio Mínguez‐Vera, 2022. "Excess executive compensation and corporate governance in the United Kingdom and Spain: A comparative analysis," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(7), pages 2817-2837, October.
    7. Tristan Auvray & Olivier Brossard, 2013. "French connection: interlocking directorates and the ownership-control nexus in an insider governance system," Working Papers hal-00842582, HAL.
    8. Alice Rossi & Silvio Vismara & Michele Meoli, 2019. "Voting rights delivery in investment-based crowdfunding: a cross-platform analysis," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 46(2), pages 251-281, June.
    9. Tristan Auvray & Olivier Brossard, 2012. "Too Dispersed to Monitor? Ownership Dispersion, Monitoring, and the Prediction of Bank Distress," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(4), pages 685-714, June.
    10. Gutiérrez, Luis H. & Pombo, Carlos, 2009. "Corporate ownership and control contestability in emerging markets: The case of Colombia," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 112-139.
    11. Lorraine Uhlaner & Mike Wright & Morten Huse, 2007. "Private Firms and Corporate Governance: An Integrated Economic and Management Perspective," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 225-241, October.
    12. Taher Hamza, 2011. "Determinants of short-term value creation for the bidder: evidence from France," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 15(2), pages 157-186, May.
    13. Gregorio Sanchez-Marin & J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler & M. Encarnacion Lucas-Perez, 2010. "Ownership Structure and Board Effectiveness as Determinants of TMT Compensation in Spanish Listed Firms," Journal of Business Economics and Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(1), pages 92-109, November.
    14. Cécile Cézanne, 2012. "Berle and Means," Chapters, in: Michael Dietrich & Jackie Krafft (ed.), Handbook on the Economics and Theory of the Firm, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    15. Chan-Jane Lin & Tawei Wang & Chao-Jung Pan, 2016. "Financial reporting quality and investment decisions for family firms," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 499-532, June.
    16. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2007-059 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Enikolopov, Ruben & Petrova, Maria & Stepanov, Sergey, 2014. "Firm value in crisis: Effects of firm-level transparency and country-level institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 72-84.
    18. Goergen, Marc & Manjon, Miguel C. & Renneboog, Luc, 2008. "Recent developments in German corporate governance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 175-193, September.
    19. Bjuggren, Per-Olof & Duggal, Rubecca & Giang, Dinh Tung, 2011. "Ownership Dispersion and Capital Structures in Family firms: A study of closed medium sized enterprises," Ratio Working Papers 175, The Ratio Institute.
    20. Ferrell, Allen & Liang, Hao & Renneboog, Luc, 2016. "Socially responsible firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 585-606.
    21. Alex Bryson & Harald Dale-Olsen & Trygve Gulbrandsen, 2016. "Family ownership, Workplace Closure and the Recession," DoQSS Working Papers 16-06, Quantitative Social Science - UCL Social Research Institute, University College London.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000411:018502. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Economia y Region (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/feutbco.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.