IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/col/000090/009172.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Voters´ Rationality Under Four Electoral Rules: A Simulation Based on the 2010 Colombian Presidential Elections

Author

Listed:
  • Julián Parada

Abstract

In this work we analyze the impact of the voting rule on individual behavior. We use a sample of individuals naturally motivated by real candidates. Then, in our methodology we do not induce preferences. Moreover, up to our knowledge, this is the first work in which both individual behavior and aggregate results are studied with a relatively large sample. We implemented an online simulation during the presidential campaigns for 2010 in Colombia. Voters were asked to submit experimental ballots under four different voting rules: plurality rule, approval voting, Borda rule and majority rule with runoff elections. We compared the observed individual behavior with two benchmarks.The fist one considers sincere voting and the second one instrumental behavior. Our results show that under approval voting and Borda rule we observe a lower level of sincerity and instrumental behavior in comparison to the other two rules. However, both models predict well the aggregate outcomes under all the voting rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Julián Parada, 2011. "Voters´ Rationality Under Four Electoral Rules: A Simulation Based on the 2010 Colombian Presidential Elections," Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad, Universidad de los Andes,Facultad de Economía, CEDE, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000090:009172
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/revistadys/Articulo68_3.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert Forsythe, 1990. "An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three-Way Elections," Discussion Papers 927, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Andrés Cendales, 2012. "Vote Buying, Political Patronage and Selective Plunder," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 49(2), pages 237-276, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Thomas A. Rietz, 1993. "Strategic Behavior in Multi-Alternative Elections: A Review of Some Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers 1026, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Robert Forsythe, 1991. "An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories," Discussion Papers 962, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Meffert, Michael F. & Gschwend, Thomas, 2007. "Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation and Coalition Governments: A Simulation and Laboratory Experiment," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-55, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    4. Myerson, Roger B. & Weber, Robert J., 1993. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(1), pages 102-114, March.
    5. Giuseppe Attanasi & Luca CORAZZINI & Nikolaos GEORGANTZIS & Francesco PASSARELLI, 2009. "Risk Aversion, Over-Confidence and Private Information as determinants of Majority Thresholds," LERNA Working Papers 09.26.302, LERNA, University of Toulouse.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting rules; instrumental strategic voters; sincere voting; social choice.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000090:009172. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Universidad De Los Andes-Cede (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ceandco.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.