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Comercio de fauna en Colombia e información oculta: nuevos retos en la regulación para su uso sostenible

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  • Rivera Virguez Liliana

Abstract

Este trabajo describe y analiza el problema de riesgo moral causado por la asimetría de información que existe entre la autoridad ambiental y los productores de fauna (zoocriaderos) que posiblemente incurren en explotación y comercialización ilícita. Usando un modelo principal-agente, se examinan los esquemas de transferencia que la autoridad ambiental podría utilizar para incentivar la preservación y el manejo de fauna, teniendo en cuenta tanto el estado de conservación del ecosistema observado por el principal (gobierno) como la función de utilidad del agente (zoocriaderos). Resultados de simulaciones del modelo analítico sugieren que el valor óptimo del beneficio por flexibilización de regulación es constante e independiente del impacto que tienen las acciones (lícitas e ilícitas) del agente sobre el ecosistema cuando hay información perfecta. Por su parte, cuando existe información asimétrica, los resultados sugieren que el nivel óptimo del beneficio por flexibilización de regulación depende del estado de la conservación del recurso que se observaría dada la acción lícita o ilícita asociada a la comercialización de la fauna.

Suggested Citation

  • Rivera Virguez Liliana, 2007. "Comercio de fauna en Colombia e información oculta: nuevos retos en la regulación para su uso sostenible," Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad, Universidad de los Andes,Facultad de Economía, CEDE, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000090:004550
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Rollins, Kimberly & Briggs, Hugh III, 1996. "Moral Hazard, Externalities, and Compensation for Crop Damages from Wildlife," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 368-386, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Información asimétrica; riesgo moral; producción-comercialización de fauna.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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