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Clocks, Caps, Compartments, and Carve‐Outs: Creating Federal Fiscal Capacity Despite Strong Veto Powers

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  • Shawn Donnelly

    (Section of Public Administration, University of Twente, The Netherlands / Institute of Political Science, Leiden University, The Netherlands)

Abstract

This article examines four mechanisms for establishing federal spending programmes despite tough opposition based on identity or ideological politics, as well as disputes between haves and have-nots. It contrasts the use of clocks (time limits), caps, compartments (special justification for spending that would otherwise have been rejected), and carve-outs (exemptions to federal spending programmes to buy off objecting veto players) to secure political support for national-level programmes, and asks under what conditions those limits might be breached. We look at the EU, Canada, and the US. These tactics are most successful at “getting to yes” for federal authorities when they can isolate individual objections. As long as those objections persist, the limits will persist as well.

Suggested Citation

  • Shawn Donnelly, 2023. "Clocks, Caps, Compartments, and Carve‐Outs: Creating Federal Fiscal Capacity Despite Strong Veto Powers," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 11(4), pages 92-101.
    • Handle: RePEc:cog:poango:v11:y:2023:i:4:p:92-101
    DOI: 10.17645/pag.v11i4.7250
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Tomasz P. Woźniakowski & Tiziano Zgaga & Sergio Fabbrini, 2023. "Comparative Fiscal Federalism and the Post‐Covid EU: Between Debt Rules and Borrowing Power," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 11(4), pages 1-5.

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