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Decentralizing hydro power production

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  • Stefan Ambec
  • Joseph Doucet

Abstract

We analyse the production of electricity from n power stations in a dynamic model. Each power station's production of electricity is constrained by the quantity of water available to it (supply constraint) as well as limitations on reservoir capacity (storage constraint). We show that hydro power production can lead to two sources of welfare loss: suboptimal management of water resources and the exercise of market power. A monopolist minimizes the first source of inefficiency, whereas decentralized production in a competitive environment minimizes the second. The decision to introduce competition in hydropower production must account for these two opposite effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Ambec & Joseph Doucet, 2003. "Decentralizing hydro power production," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 36(3), pages 587-607, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:36:y:2003:i:3:p:587-607
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-5982.t01-2-00004
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    4. Stefan Ambec & Joseph A. Doucet, 2001. "Competition along a river : Decentralizing hydropower production," CSEF Working Papers 56, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    5. Chatterjee, Bishu & Howitt, Richard E. & Sexton, Richard J., 1998. "The Optimal Joint Provision of Water for Irrigation and Hydropower," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 295-313, November.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. van Ackere, Ann & Ochoa, Patricia, 2010. "Managing a hydro-energy reservoir: A policy approach," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(11), pages 7299-7311, November.
    2. Stefan Ambec & Claude Crampes, 2019. "Decarbonizing Electricity Generation with Intermittent Sources of Energy," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(6), pages 1105-1134.
    3. Ambec, Stefan & Crampes, Claude, 2010. "Electricity Production with Intermittent Sources," IDEI Working Papers 608, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    4. KLAUS ABBINK & MOLLER, Lars Christian & SARAH O'HARA, 2005. "The Syr Darya River Conflict: An Experimental Case Study," Discussion Papers 2005-14, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    5. Genc, Talat S. & Thille, Henry, 2011. "Investment in electricity markets with asymmetric technologies," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 379-387, May.
    6. Crampes, Claude & Moreaux, Michel, 2009. "Pumped Storage and Energy Saving," TSE Working Papers 09-073, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    7. Moita, Rodrigo Menon Simões & Monte, Daniel, 2017. "Competition in cascades," Textos para discussão 456, FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil).
    8. Houeida Hedfi & Ahlem Dakhlaoui, 2020. "Electricity Industrial Organization: What About The Strategic Behavior Of Hydro And Thermal Operators?," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 10(2), pages 438-442.
    9. Rangel, Luiz Fernando, 2008. "Competition policy and regulation in hydro-dominated electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 1292-1302, April.
    10. Abdessalem Abbassi & Ahlem Dakhlaoui & Nihed Ben Khalifa, 2023. "Risk Aversion and Hydro-energy Reservoirs Management under Monopolistic and Oligopolistic Industrial Structures," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 13(6), pages 581-590, November.
    11. Ambec, Stefan & Crampes, Claude, 2012. "Electricity provision with intermittent sources of energy," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 319-336.
    12. Rayamajhee, Veeshan & Joshi, Aakrit, 2018. "Economic trade-offs between hydroelectricity production and environmental externalities: A case for local externality mitigation fund," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 129(PA), pages 237-244.
    13. Abbassi, Abdessalem & Dakhlaoui, Ahlem & Tamini, Lota D., 2014. "Risk Aversion and Dynamic Games Between Hydroelectric Operators under Uncertainty," Working Papers 172089, University of Laval, Center for Research on the Economics of the Environment, Agri-food, Transports and Energy (CREATE).
    14. Vehviläinen, Iivo, 2023. "Greed is good? Of equilibrium impacts in environmental regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    15. Stefan Ambec & Claude Crampes, 2010. "Electricity Production with Intermittent Sources of Energy," LERNA Working Papers 10.07.313, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    16. Robert Clark & Andrew Leach, 2005. "La réglementation de l'énergie au Québec," CIRANO Burgundy Reports 2005rb-04, CIRANO.
    17. Fadoua CHIBA, 2016. "Optimal taxation with intermittent generation," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) 2016-26, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA).
    18. Crampes, Claude & Moreaux, Michel, 2008. "Pumping Water to Compete in Electricity Markets," IDEI Working Papers 507, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    19. Klaus Abbink & Lars Moller & Sarah O’Hara, 2010. "Sources of Mistrust: An Experimental Case Study of a Central Asian Water Conflict," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(2), pages 283-318, February.
    20. Haddad, Mohamed S., 2011. "Capacity choice and water management in hydroelectricity systems," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 168-177, March.
    21. Finn R. Førsund, 2006. "The Anatomy of Market Power in Electricity Markets with Hydropower as Dominating Technology," ICER Working Papers 21-2006, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    22. Robert Clark & Andrew Leach, 2005. "Energy Regulation in Quebec," CIRANO Burgundy Reports 2005rb-03, CIRANO.
    23. Hoel, Michael, 2004. "Electricity prices in a mixed thermal and hydropower system," Memorandum 28/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    24. Moita, Rodrigo Menon & Monte, Daniel, 2020. "Hydroeletric Generators Competing in Cascades," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 74(1), March.
    25. Genc, Talat S. & Thille, Henry & ElMawazini, Khaled, 2020. "Dynamic competition in electricity markets under uncertainty," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy

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