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Reference Functions and Balanced Concessions in Bargaining

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  • Nejat Anbarci

Abstract

In bargaining, agents expect their concessions to be reciprocated. Using the 'reference function' concept of W. Thomson (1981), this paper constructs a class of solutions the outcomes of which lead to balanced concessions by agents as prescribed by the reference function adopted. The Kalai/Smorodinsky (1975) solution arises as a special case. Another solution in this class, which depends on the entire feasible set, is generated by using the center of gravity as the reference function.

Suggested Citation

  • Nejat Anbarci, 1995. "Reference Functions and Balanced Concessions in Bargaining," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(3), pages 675-682, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:28:y:1995:i:3:p:675-82
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nejat Anbarci & Ching-jen Sun, 2011. "Distributive justice and the Nash bargaining solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(3), pages 453-470, September.
    2. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Jaume García-Segarra & Miguel Ginés-Vilar, 2018. "Anchoring on Utopia: a generalization of the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(2), pages 141-155, October.
    3. Driesen, Bram, 2012. "Proportional concessions and the leximin solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 288-291.
    4. Anbarci, Nejat & Boyd III, John H., 2011. "Nash demand game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 14-22, January.
    5. Jaume García Segarra & Miguel Ginés Vilar, 2011. "Weighted Proportional Losses Solution," ThE Papers 10/21, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    6. Nejat Anbarci, 1998. "Simple Characterizations of the Nash and Kalai/smorodinsky Solutions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 255-261, December.
    7. Ismail Saglam, 2020. "Bargaining over collusion: the threat of supply function versus Cournot competition under demand uncertainty and cost asymmetry," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 671-693, October.
    8. Saglam, Ismail, 2018. "Bargaining over Collusion Profits under Cost Asymmetry and Demand Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 84007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Younghwan In, 2008. "On the relevance of alternatives in bargaining: generalized average pay-off solutions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 37(2), pages 251-264, June.
    10. Forgo, F. & Szidarovszky, F., 2003. "On the relation between the Nash bargaining solution and the weighting method," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 108-116, May.

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