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VW, Lufthansa: Verzerrt eine zu große Nähe der Politik zur Industrie den Wettbewerb?

Author

Listed:
  • Nils-Peter Schepp
  • Achim Wambach
  • Florian Schuhmacher
  • Birger P. Priddat
  • Justus Haucap
  • Andreas Mundt

Abstract

Das Land Niedersachsen gehört zu den größten Anteilseignern beim VW-Konzern, die Bundesregierung gesteht Air Berlin Bürgschaften zu. Sind dies wettbewerbsverzerrende politische Interventionen, die aus den besonderen Beziehungen zwischen Wirtschaft und Politik entstehen, oder nur das Setzen von guten Rahmenbe­dingungen für einen funktionierenden Wettbewerb? Nils-Peter Schepp, Monopolkommission, und Achim Wambach, Monopolkommission und ZEW, Mannheim, betonen, dass es Aufgabe der öffentlichen Hand sei, sich für einen hohen Beschäftigungsstand und ein stetiges und angemessenes Wirtschaftswachstum einzusetzen, dies aber nicht mit der Förderung einzelner Unternehmen oder gar nationaler Champions gleichzusetzen sei. Um Wettbewerbsverzerrungen zu vermeiden, sei eine zu große Nähe von Politik und einzelnen Unternehmen zu vermeiden. Florian Schuhmacher, Universität Wien, erinnert daran, dass es zu den wesentlichsten Errungenschaften der modernen Wettbewerbstheorie gehört, dass die Politik den Rahmen vorgebe, die individuellen wirtschaftlichen Entscheidungen allerdings von den Marktteilnehmern, den Unternehmen, aber auch den Verbrauchern zu treffen seien. Wesentliches Element des so verstandenen Wettbewerbs sei es daher, dass alle Unternehmen zu denselben Bedingungen auf dem Markt aktiv sind. Birger P. Priddat, Universität Witten/Herdecke, sieht in der Bundesbürgschaft für Air Berlin eine wettbewerbsverzerrende politische Intervention, die aus den besonderen Beziehungen zwischen Wirtschaft und Politik entsteht. Sein Vorschlag: Auf jeden Lobbykontakt sollte ein paritätischer Wissenschaftskontakt stattfinden, damit ebenso selbstverständliche Milieus von Politik und Wissenschaft entstünden, wie sie für Politik und Wirtschaft längst schon existierten. Um staatlich teils ganz bewusst induzierte Wettbewerbsverzerrungen noch besser zu adressieren, empfiehlt Justus Haucap, Universität Düsseldorf, unter anderem die vollständige Privatisierung der Deutschen Telekom und der Deutschen Post und anderer staatlicher Unternehmen sowie bei sämtlichen Beihilfenregelungen die Zulassung von Klagen betroffener Wettbewerber und ihrer Verbände vor den Gerichten der Europäischen Union. Andreas Mundt, Bundeskartellamt, unterstreicht die Bedeutung des Wettbewerbs als zentralen Innovationsförderer: Innovationen gehen nicht von bequem gewordenen Monopolisten oder von staatlicher Industriepolitik aus, sondern entstehen durch Wettbewerb.

Suggested Citation

  • Nils-Peter Schepp & Achim Wambach & Florian Schuhmacher & Birger P. Priddat & Justus Haucap & Andreas Mundt, 2017. "VW, Lufthansa: Verzerrt eine zu große Nähe der Politik zur Industrie den Wettbewerb?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 70(20), pages 03-15, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:70:y:2017:i:20:p:03-15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Staatliche Einflussnahme; Interessenpolitik; Wettbewerb; Wirkungsanalyse;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
    • L53 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Enterprise Policy

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