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Zinserhöhung der EZB: Wie groß ist die Inflationsgefahr?

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas Mayer
  • Holger Schmieding
  • Manfred Jäger-Ambrozewicz
  • Michael Lamla
  • Jan-Egbert Sturm
  • Ulrich Kater
  • Leon Leschus
  • Wolfgang Brachinger

Abstract

Für Thomas Mayer, Deutsche Bank, erscheint es sinnvoll, dass die EZB den Leitzins auf sein neutrales Niveau hochführt. Noch wichtiger für die Wahrung der Stabilität des Euro wäre es aber, dass sich die EZB aus der Finanzierung von durch Insolvenz bedrohten Staaten und ihren Banken zurückzieht. Holger Schmieding, Berenberg Bank, sieht keine Inflationsgefahr. Er rechnet für Deutschland mit einem jährlichen Preisanstieg von gut 2%. Manfred Jäger-Ambroz.ewicz, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, vertritt die Meinung, dass die EZB eine sachgerechte Leitzinspolitik umsetzt und einen angemessenen Leitzinspfad suggeriert. Michael Lamla und Jan-Egbert Sturm, ETH Zürich, betonen, dass die EZB genügend Glaubwürdigkeit und Transparenz besitzt, um die Inflationserwartungen zu beeinflussen und zu homogenisieren. Ihrer Ansicht nach steigen insgesamt die Inflationserwartungen im Euroraum für das nächste Jahr weiterhin an, ohne aber beunruhigende Werte anzunehmen. Auch Ulrich Kater, DekaBank, sieht die Glaubwürdigkeit des Inflationsregimes mit der Geldwertstabilität als wichtigster Zielsetzung unabhängiger Notenbanken nicht gefährdet. Leon Leschus, HWWI, geht davon aus, dass hohe Rohstoffpreise weiterhin zum Inflationsdruck beitragen werden. Es wäre somit wünschenswert, wenn die EZB ihre begonnene restriktive Geldpolitik fortsetzen würde. Hans Wolfgang Brachinger, Universität Fribourg, sieht angesichts teurer Rohstoffe, zunehmender Spekulation und steigender Produktionskosten in China die Inflationsrisiken in Deutschland wachsen, und zwar unabhängig vom Handeln der EZB.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Mayer & Holger Schmieding & Manfred Jäger-Ambrozewicz & Michael Lamla & Jan-Egbert Sturm & Ulrich Kater & Leon Leschus & Wolfgang Brachinger, 2011. "Zinserhöhung der EZB: Wie groß ist die Inflationsgefahr?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 64(14), pages 03-26, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:64:y:2011:i:14:p:03-26
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Preisniveaustabilität; Geldpolitik; Zins; Zinspolitik; Inflation; Zentralbank; Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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