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Deutschlands Beitrag zur Lösung des Weltklimaproblems: Was lässt sich erreichen?

Author

Listed:
  • Sigmar Gabriel
  • Till Requate
  • Alfred Endres
  • Lutz Wicke
  • Rüdiger Pethig

Abstract

Der Stern-Report, der vierte IPCC-Bericht der UNO und nicht zuletzt der extrem warme Winter 2006/07 haben die Klimaproblematik wieder in de Mittelpunkt des öffentlichen Interesses gerückt. Welchen Beitrag kann und sollte Deutschland zur Lösung des Weltklimaproblems leisten? Die Antwort von Sigmar Gabriel, Bundesminister für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, lautet: eine massive Steigerung der Energieeffizienz und ein deutlich verstärkter Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien. Gabriel weist darauf hin, dass ein anspruchsvoller Klimaschutz volkswirtschaftlich die einzige vernünftige Alternative sei und die Bundesregierung 20 Themenfelder identifiziert habe, in denen sie stärker tätig werden oder neue Maßnahmen ergreifen werde. Till Requate, Universität Kiel, ist skeptisch. Zwar sei das jüngst formulierte Ziel der EU, den CO2-Ausstoß europaweit bis zum Jahr 2020 um 20% zu senken, durchaus ehrgeizig, allerdings garantiere eine 20%ige Reduktion der CO2-Emissionen in Europa keineswegs eine ebensolche Reduktion weltweit. Auch Alfred Endres, FernUniversität Hagen, ist eher pessimistisch. Nach traditioneller spieltheoretischer Doktrin sei es angesichts der prekären Verteilung von Nutzen und Kosten völlig aussichtslos, eine nationale Klimapolitik zu betreiben, da sich jeder einzelne Staat im Gefangenendilemma befinde. Lutz Wicke, Europäische Wirtschaftshochschule, Berlin, entwirft in seinem Beitrag das Programm "Kyoto PLUS", das einen globalen Emissionshandel für eine zukünftig wirksame Weltklimapolitik enthält. Nach Ansicht von Rüdiger Pethig, Universität Siegen, müsste Deutschland, um einen wesentlichen Beitrag zur Lösung des Weltklimaproblems zu leisten, bereit sein, größere Emissionsreduktionsverpflichtungen zu übernehmen als die, die es gerade im Rahmen der EU eingegangen ist, und sich auf der Grundlage der so gewonnenen Glaubwürdigkeit intensiv bemühen, die EU-Partner ebenso wie die übrigen Großemittenten zu einer effektiven Kooperation zu bewegen. Eine positive Perspektive sieht Pethig darin, dass in den letzten Jahren Änderungen eingetreten seien, die eine Verbesserung der künftigen internationalen Kooperation erwarten lassen.

Suggested Citation

  • Sigmar Gabriel & Till Requate & Alfred Endres & Lutz Wicke & Rüdiger Pethig, 2007. "Deutschlands Beitrag zur Lösung des Weltklimaproblems: Was lässt sich erreichen?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 60(07), pages 03-18, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:60:y:2007:i:07:p:03-18
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael Finus & Ekko Ierland & Rob Dellink, 2006. "Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 271-291, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Klimaschutz; Klimaveränderung; Energiepolitik; Emissionshandel; Umweltabkommen; Deutschland; EU-Staaten;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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