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Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: The Political Constraints Approach of Henisz

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  • Nick Hoffmann

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  • Nick Hoffmann, 2010. "Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: The Political Constraints Approach of Henisz," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 8(02), pages 53-59, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifodic:v:8:y:2010:i:02:p:53-59
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Witold Jerzy Henisz, 2004. "Political Institutions and Policy Volatility," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 1-27, March.
    2. Witold J. Henisz, 2002. "The institutional environment for infrastructure investment," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 11(2), pages 355-389.
    3. W. J. Henisz, 2000. "The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 1-31, March.
    4. Tsebelis, George, 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(3), pages 289-325, July.
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    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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