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Algorithmes de prix, intelligence artificielle et équilibres collusifs

Author

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  • Frédéric Marty

Abstract

Algorithmic pricing can help competitors to collude. Big Data, real-time pricing, and predictive analysis can allow a tacit collusion agreement and a durable equilibrium to be reached quickly. Artificial intelligence poses a specific challenge because the algorithm may autonomously discover the possible gains associated with this kind of non-aggression agreement and also because it is particularly difficult to analyse its decision-making process. Hence sanctioning this on the grounds of prohibiting anti-competitive practices is not straightforward. This paper explores the alternative ways of regulation, through audits or the implementation of liability rules. JEL Codes: K21, K24, L41

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Marty, 2017. "Algorithmes de prix, intelligence artificielle et équilibres collusifs," Revue internationale de droit économique, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(2), pages 83-116.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:riddbu:ride_312_0083
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    Cited by:

    1. Frédéric Marty & Thierry Warin, 2020. "Digital Platforms' Information Concentration: From Keystone Players to Gatekeepers," Working Papers hal-03086987, HAL.
    2. Nathalie de Marcellis-Warin & Frédéric Marty & Eva Thelisson & Thierry Warin, 2020. "Artificial Intelligence and Market Manipulations: Ex-ante Evaluation in the Regulator's Arsenal," Working Papers halshs-03041690, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    algorithmic pricing; artificial intelligence; tacit collusion; liability rules; antitrust enforcement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K24 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Cyber Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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