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Duisenberg and Trichet: Measures of their Degree of Conservatism

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  • Ibrahima Diouf
  • Dominique Pépin

Abstract

This paper suggests, on the basis of the New Keynesian model, a measure of the degree of conservatism of the European Central Banker. At first, we notice that the appointment of the President of the European Central Bank was made after substantive disagreements about the degree of conservatism (institutional and personal) of the candidates. Secondly, we apply this measure to the change of presidency (from Duisenberg to Trichet) in order to explore the possibility of a step change in the conduct of the ECB?s monetary policy. Finally, our results show that once appointed, the two Central Bankers adapted to the institutional framework in which they made decisions. JEL Classification : E52, E58

Suggested Citation

  • Ibrahima Diouf & Dominique Pépin, 2010. "Duisenberg and Trichet: Measures of their Degree of Conservatism," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 76(2), pages 145-162.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_762_0145
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    1. Maier, Philipp & Bezoen, Saskia, 2004. "Bashing and supporting central banks: the Bundesbank and the European Central Bank," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 923-939, November.
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    5. Bertocchi, Graziella & Spagat, Michael, 1993. "Learning, experimentation, and monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 169-183, August.
    6. Maier, Philipp & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & de Haan, Jakob, 2002. "Political pressure on the Bundesbank: an empirical investigation using the Havrilesky approach," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 103-123, March.
    7. Acheson, Keith & Chant, John F, 1973. "Bureaucratic Theory and the Choice of Central Bank Goals," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 5(2), pages 637-655, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Diouf, Ibrahima & Pépin, Dominique, 2017. "Gender and central banking," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 193-206.
    2. Jean-Yves Filbien & Fabien Labondance, 2012. "Reactions Des Marches D’Actions De La Zone Euro Aux Annonces Non Anticipees De La Bce," Brussels Economic Review, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 55(2), pages 179-204.
    3. Diouf, Ibrahima & Pépin, Dominique, 2017. "Gender and central banking," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 193-206.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    degree of conservatism; European Central Bank; monetary policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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