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La mise en œuvre de la réglementation : une lecture économico-juridique du secteur électrique et des marchés publics

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  • Thierry Kirat
  • Frédéric Marty

Abstract

The basic idea of the paper is that the empirical meaning of rules is far from being totally contained in their initial statement. The article concentrates on the economic scope of rules and regulations, and their implementation by players such as the State bureaucracy, regulatory agencies, and courts. The empiricalanalysis concernselectricutilitiesand public procurement, with a focus on defense procurement. We begin by examining a key issue: how does the institutional architecture of regulation systems operate? We then address the implementation of rules, which emerges as a more complex process than a mere enforcement of rules prescribing specific types of behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Kirat & Frédéric Marty, 2006. "La mise en œuvre de la réglementation : une lecture économico-juridique du secteur électrique et des marchés publics," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(4), pages 101-116.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:ecoldc:ecop_175_0101
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    law; regulation; electric utilities; procurement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy

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