IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/rneart/v3y2004i3n2.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

New Tools for Studying Network Industry Reforms in Developing Countries: The Telecommunications and Electricity Regulation Database

Author

Listed:
  • Wallsten Scott

    (The World Bank Group and the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies)

  • Clarke George

    (The World Bank Group and the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies)

  • Haggarty Luke

    (The World Bank Group and the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies)

  • Kaneshiro Rosario

    (The World Bank Group and the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies)

  • Noll Roger

    (The World Bank Group and the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies)

  • Shirley Mary

    (The World Bank Group and the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies)

  • Xu Lixin Colin

    (The World Bank Group and the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies)

Abstract

We construct comprehensive and consistent datasets on telecommunications and electricity regulations in developing countries through extensive surveys of regulators. The database of telecommunications regulations includes 178 variables on regulatory governance and content in 45 countries. The database of electricity regulations includes 374 variables in 20 countries. This paper motivates the data collection exercise, explains the survey design, and provides a few examples of the types of information and results the data can yield. The appendix provides links to the freely available datasets and codebooks.

Suggested Citation

  • Wallsten Scott & Clarke George & Haggarty Luke & Kaneshiro Rosario & Noll Roger & Shirley Mary & Xu Lixin Colin, 2004. "New Tools for Studying Network Industry Reforms in Developing Countries: The Telecommunications and Electricity Regulation Database," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(3), pages 1-35, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:3:y:2004:i:3:n:2
    DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1053
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1446-9022.1053
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2202/1446-9022.1053?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baron, David P., 1989. "Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 1347-1447, Elsevier.
    2. Braeutigam, Ronald R., 1989. "Optimal policies for natural monopolies," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 23, pages 1289-1346, Elsevier.
    3. Noll, Roger G., 1989. "Economic perspectives on the politics of regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 1253-1287, Elsevier.
    4. repec:reg:rpubli:308 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Berg, Sanford V. & Jiang, Liangliang & Lin, Chen, 2012. "Regulation and corporate corruption: New evidence from the telecom sector," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 22-43.
    2. Zhang, Yinfang & Parker, David & Kirkpatrick, Colin, 2005. "Competition, regulation and privatisation of electricity generation in developing countries: does the sequencing of the reforms matter?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 358-379, May.
    3. Monasso, Ton & van Leijden, Fabian, 2007. "Telecommunication regulation as a game: deepening theoretical understanding," MPRA Paper 7625, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Jamasb, Tooraj, 2006. "Between the state and market: Electricity sector reform in developing countries," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 14-30, March.
    5. Nagayama, Hiroaki, 2007. "Effects of regulatory reforms in the electricity supply industry on electricity prices in developing countries," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 3440-3462, June.
    6. Avilés, Judith Mariscal, 2020. "A tale of two reforms: Telecommunications reforms in Mexico," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(7).
    7. Gasmi, Farid & Maingard, Alexis & Noumba Um, Paul & Recuero Virto, Laura, 2011. "Empirical evidence on the impact of privatization of fixed-line operators on telecommunications performance - Comparing OECD, Latin American, and African countries," IDEI Working Papers 660, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    8. Gasmi, Farid & Recuero Virto, Laura, 2010. "The determinants and impact of telecommunications reforms in developing countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 275-286, November.
    9. Thomas W. Hazlett, 2008. "Property Rights and Wireless License Values," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 563-598, August.
    10. David Sappington & Dennis Weisman, 2010. "Price cap regulation: what have we learned from 25 years of experience in the telecommunications industry?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 227-257, December.
    11. Estache, Antonio & Goicoechea, Ana, 2005. "How widespread were private investment and regulatory reform in infrastructure utilities during the 1990s?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3595, The World Bank.
    12. Farid Gasmi & Paul Noumba Um & Laura Recuero Virto, 2009. "Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries: An Empirical Analysis," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 23(3), pages 509-531, October.
    13. Polemis, Michael L., 2016. "New evidence on the impact of structural reforms on electricity sector performance," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 420-431.
    14. Gasmi, F. & Maingard, A. & Noumba, P. & Recuero Virto, L., 2013. "The Privatization of the Fixed-Line Telecommunications Operator in OECD, Latin America, Asia, and Africa: One Size Does Not Fit All," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 189-208.
    15. Bruno E. Viani, 2011. "Consequences of Vertical Separation and Monopoly: Evidence From the Telecom Privatizations," Journal of Media Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(2), pages 70-97, June.
    16. Paulo Correa & Carlos Pereira & Bernardo Mueller & Marcus Melo, 2006. "Regulatory Governance in Infrastructure Industries: Assessment and Measurement of Brazilian Regulators," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 7059.
    17. Martin, Brandie L. & Jayakar, Krishna, 2013. "Moving beyond dichotomy: Comparing composite telecommunications regulatory governance indices," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 691-701.
    18. Clarke, George R.G. & Wallsten, Scott J., 2004. "Has the internet increased trade? Evidence from industrial and developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3215, The World Bank.
    19. Maiorano, Federica & Stern, Jon, 2007. "Institutions and telecommunications infrastructure in low and middle-income countries: The case of mobile telephony," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 165-181, September.
    20. Wallsten, Scott, 2005. "Regulation and Internet Use in Developing Countries," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(2), pages 501-523, January.
    21. Davies, Ryan J. & Hevert, Kathleen T., 2020. "Stay-out adjustments and multi-year regulatory rate plans," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 105-114.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Polemis, Michael L., 2016. "New evidence on the impact of structural reforms on electricity sector performance," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 420-431.
    2. Óscar A. Alfonso R. (ed.) & Pedro Ignacio Bernal F. (ed.), 2022. "Las carencias de agua potable en Colombia. Análisis del derecho humano al agua y la eficacia de las políticas," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Economía, number 84.
    3. Çetin, Tamer & Yasin Eryigit, Kadir, 2013. "The economic effects of government regulation: Evidence from the New York taxicab market," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 169-177.
    4. Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jerome, 2010. "The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 1008-1019, December.
    5. Larry Blank & John Mayo, 2009. "Endogenous Regulatory Constraints and the Emergence of Hybrid Regulation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 35(3), pages 233-255, November.
    6. Kevin Currier, 2004. "Natural monopoly regulation in the presence of cost misreporting," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 32(1), pages 49-61, March.
    7. Joskow, Paul L. & Rose, Nancy L. & Shepard, Andrea., 1993. "Regulatory constraints on executive compensation," Working papers 3550-93., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    8. Paul Joskow & Nancy Rose & Andrea Shepard, 1993. "Regulatory Constraints on CEO Compensation," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(1 Microec), pages 1-72.
    9. Esfahani, Hadi Salehi, 2000. "Institutions and government controls," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 197-229, December.
    10. Massarutto, Antonio, 2020. "Servant of too many masters: Residential water pricing and the challenge of sustainability," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    11. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
    12. J.A. den Hertog, 2010. "Review of economic theories of regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.
    13. Armin Schmutzler, 1996. "Pollution control with imperfectly observable emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 7(3), pages 251-262, April.
    14. Gilbert, Guy & Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Incentives and optimal size of local jurisdictions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 19-41, January.
    15. Avenali, Alessandro & Catalano, Giuseppe & D'Alfonso, Tiziana & Matteucci, Giorgio, 2020. "The allocation of national public resources in the Italian local public bus transport sector," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    16. Xavier Fageda Sanjuan, 2004. "Measuring Conduct and Cost Parameters in the Spanish Air Transport Market," Working Papers in Economics 125, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    17. Benchekroun, Hassan & van Long, Ngo, 1998. "Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 325-342, November.
    18. Lawrence White, 2002. "International Trade In Services: More Than Meets the Eye," Working Papers 02-13, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    19. Gérard Gaudet & Pierre Lasserre & Ngo Van Long, 1995. "Real Investment Decisions Under Information Constraints," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-33, CIRANO.
    20. Lindemann, Henrik, 2015. "Regulatory Objectives and the Intensity of Unbundling in Electricity Markets," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-544, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:3:y:2004:i:3:n:2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.