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Does Limited Liability Matter? Evidence From Nineteenth-Century British Banking

Author

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  • Acheson Graeme G.

    (Ulster Business School, University of Ulster, N. Ireland)

  • Hickson Charles R

    (Queen’s University Management School, Queen’s University Belfast, N. Ireland)

  • Turner John D

    (Queen’s University Management School, Queen’s University Belfast, N. Ireland)

Abstract

The superiority of the corporation over other organizational forms is typically attributed to the fact that every owner has limited liability. The widely-held, but empirically unsubstantiated, view is that the main advantage of limited liability over extended shareholder liability is that the enforcement costs of the latter generally impedes the tradability and liquidity of stock. We use the rich shareholder-liability experience of nineteenth-century British banking to test this standard view. As well as exploring the means by which unlimited liability was enforced, we examine the impact of liability regimes on the tradability and liquidity of stock. Our evidence suggests that liability rules appear to be irrelevant from the perspective of stock tradability and liquidity.

Suggested Citation

  • Acheson Graeme G. & Hickson Charles R & Turner John D, 2010. "Does Limited Liability Matter? Evidence From Nineteenth-Century British Banking," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 247-273, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:6:y:2010:i:2:n:6
    DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1444
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Graeme G. Acheson & John D. Turner, 2006. "The impact of limited liability on ownership and control: Irish banking, 1877–19141," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 59(2), pages 320-346, May.
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    6. Anderson, Gary M. & Tollison, Robert D., 1983. "The myth of the corporation as a creation of the state," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 107-120, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gary Gorton & Ellis W. Tallman, 2016. "How Did Pre-Fed Banking Panics End?," Working Papers (Old Series) 1603, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    2. Willison, Matthew, 2018. "Were banks special? Contrasting viewpoints in mid-nineteenth century Britain," Bank of England working papers 755, Bank of England.
    3. Grant Fleming & Frank Liu & David Merrett & Simon Ville, 2022. "Share ownership and the introduction of no liability legislation in nineteenth-century Australia," CEH Discussion Papers 11, Centre for Economic History, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
    4. Fabio Braggion & Lyndon Moore, 2013. "How insiders traded before rules," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 55(4), pages 565-584, June.
    5. Graeme G. Acheson & Gareth Campbell & John D. Turner & Nadia Vanteeva, 2015. "Corporate ownership and control in Victorian Britain," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 68(3), pages 911-936, August.
    6. Foreman-Peck, James & Hannah, Leslie, 2011. "Extreme Divorce: the Managerial Revolution in UK Companies before 1914," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2011/21, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    7. Jiaqi Qin & Yan Sun, 2023. "Unveil the veil of limited liability: Evidence from firm investment," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 485-511, August.
    8. Amaury de Vicqde & Christiaan van Bochove, 2024. "Lending a hand: help banks in the Netherlands, 1848–1898," European Review of Economic History, European Historical Economics Society, vol. 28(2), pages 163-192.
    9. David Laidler, 2013. "Reassessing the Thesis of the Monetary History," University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20135, University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute.
    10. Turner, John D., 2014. "Financial history and financial economics," QUCEH Working Paper Series 14-03, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History.
    11. Andrew G. Haldane, 2012. "Control Rights (And Wrongs)," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 47-58, June.
    12. Button, Richard & Knott, Samual & Macmanus, Conor & Willison, Matthew, 2015. "Desperate adventurers and men of straw: the failure of City of Glasgow Bank and its enduring impact on the UK banking system," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 55(1), pages 23-35.
    13. Salter, Alexander W. & Veetil, Vipin & White, Lawrence H., 2017. "Extended shareholder liability as a means to constrain moral hazard in insured banks," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 153-160.

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