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The agricultural sector has the most efficient management of state receivables in the Czech Republic

Author

Listed:
  • Karel ZEMAN

    (Department of Economic and Social Policy, National Economic Faculty, University of Economics in Prague, Prague, Czech Republic)

  • Jan HRON

    (Department of Management, Faculty of Economics and Management, Czech University of Life Sciences Prague, Prague, Czech Republic)

Abstract

The article's objective, which is to identify the causes of the very poor level of management of the administration of these state assets, to present the possibilities of a long-tested experimental model at the Land Fund of the Czech Republic, and to draw attention to this model's potential in its possible implementation in administration of the entire management complex of these state assets in the Czech Republic. The authors first dealt with the theoretical aspects of the given issue, and then prepared an analysis of the original debt collection management "system". This is logically followed by an analysis of the experimental model's efficiency, rounded off with its conclusions. The final chapter contains the results of the research aimed at the current level of knowledge of the examined issue in compressed form, further the outcomes of the research concerned with original unsystematic debt collection management, also results of the implementation of the experimental model, and the assessment of the significance belonging to the results of implementing the experimental model for the entire national economy of the Czech Republic.

Suggested Citation

  • Karel ZEMAN & Jan HRON, 2018. "The agricultural sector has the most efficient management of state receivables in the Czech Republic," Agricultural Economics, Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences, vol. 64(2), pages 61-73.
    • Handle: RePEc:caa:jnlage:v:64:y:2018:i:2:id:257-2016-agricecon
    DOI: 10.17221/257/2016-AGRICECON
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    References listed on IDEAS

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