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Rethinking the Economic Model of Deterrence: How Insights from Empirical Social Science Could Affect Policies Towards Crime and Punishment

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  • Girvan Erik J.

    (University of Minnesota, Twin Cities)

Abstract

Game-theoretic models incorporating neo-classical economic assumptions can be a powerful tool for identifying and analyzing issues relevant to legal policy. In this paper I argue that, where those assumptions are deficient, the efficacy of and insights from such models can be improved by incorporating insights from experimental social sciences. Following this paradigm, I propose an expansion of the neo-classical deterrence model of criminal behavior to incorporate, as reputation effects, social scientific theory regarding the effects of in-group norms on behavior. Analysis of the expanded model shows that there are material differences between the classic and expanded models in predictions, the latter of which are more consistent with macro-level observations. I then discuss some substantive implications of the predictions of the expanded model for criminal legal policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Girvan Erik J., 2009. "Rethinking the Economic Model of Deterrence: How Insights from Empirical Social Science Could Affect Policies Towards Crime and Punishment," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 461-491, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:5:y:2009:i:1:n:19
    DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1329
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Devah Pager, 2003. "The mark of a criminal record," Natural Field Experiments 00319, The Field Experiments Website.
    2. Steven D. Levitt, 1996. "The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(2), pages 319-351.
    3. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
    4. Simon, Herbert A., 1985. "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 293-304, June.
    5. Samuel L. Myers, 1983. "Estimating the Economic Model of Crime: Employment Versus Punishment Effects," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(1), pages 157-166.
    6. Mustard, David B, 2001. "Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 285-314, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Prinz, Aloys & Muehlbacher, Stephan & Kirchler, Erich, 2014. "The slippery slope framework on tax compliance: An attempt to formalization," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 20-34.

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