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Centralization versus Decentralization of Legislative Production and the Effect on Litigation: A Case Study

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  • Di Vita Giuseppe

    (Department of Economics and Business and Faculty of Law, University of Catania, Palazzo delle Scienze – Corso Italia, 55, 95128 Catania, Italy)

Abstract

This paper presents an empirical investigation into the effects on the duration of disputes of the coordination externalities that arise from the decentralization of laws and regulatory power from the state to the regions. To this aim we consider Italy, whose territory is divided into twenty regions, using a dataset derived from 800 judgements pronounced by the Italian regional administrative courts over eight years, from 2000 to 2007. The most important result of our research is that in sectors where European legislation prevails, and lower coordination externalities are observed, we find a shorter duration of disputes, whilst in economic sectors more exposed to decentralized legislation, with greater coordination externalities, disputes tend to have a longer duration.

Suggested Citation

  • Di Vita Giuseppe, 2015. "Centralization versus Decentralization of Legislative Production and the Effect on Litigation: A Case Study," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(2), pages 267-291, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:11:y:2015:i:2:p:267-291:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/rle-2015-0022
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Giuseppina Gianfreda & Giovanna Vallanti, 2020. "Labor Courts and Firing Costs: The Labor‐Market Effects of Trial Delays," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 40-84, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    coordination externalities; duration of disputes; Italian regional administrative courts; multi-level regulatory governance; survival analysis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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