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Anreizregulierung bei Stromverteilnetzen: Effizienz versus Investitionen

Author

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  • Brunekreeft Gert

    (Jacobs University Bremen, Campus Ring 1, 28759 Bremen)

  • Meyer Roland

    (Jacobs University Bremen, Campus Ring 1, 28759 Bremen)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Brunekreeft Gert & Meyer Roland, 2016. "Anreizregulierung bei Stromverteilnetzen: Effizienz versus Investitionen," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 17(2), pages 172-187, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:pewipo:v:17:y:2016:i:2:p:172-187:n:2
    DOI: 10.1515/pwp-2016-0010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:ces:ifodic:v:8:y:2010:i:3:p:14566947 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. M.E. Beesley & S.C. Littlechild, 1989. "The Regulation of Privatized Monopolies in the United Kingdom," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 454-472, Autumn.
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    4. Joskow, Paul L, 1974. "Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 291-327, October.
    5. Ingo Vogelsang, 2010. "The Tension Between Incentive Regulation and Investments in Network Industries," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 8(3), pages 13-18, October.
    6. Richard J. Gilbert & David M. Newbery, 1994. "The Dynamic Efficiency of Regulatory Constitutions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(4), pages 538-554, Winter.
    7. Ai, Chunrong & Sappington, David E M, 2002. "The Impact of State Incentive Regulation on the U.S. Telecommunications Industry," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 133-159, September.
    8. Rahmatallah Poudineh & Tooraj Jamasb, 2016. "A New Perspective: Investment and Efficiency under Incentive Regulation," The Energy Journal, , vol. 37(1), pages 158-182, January.
    9. Graeme Guthrie, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(4), pages 925-972, December.
    10. Gert Brunekreeft and Sven Twelemann, 2005. "Regulation, Competition and Investment in the German Electricity Market: RegTP or REGTP," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Special I), pages 99-126.
    11. Sappington, David E. M. & Pfeifenberger, Johannes P. & Hanser, Philip & Basheda, Gregory N., 2001. "The State of Performance-Based Regulation in the U.S. Electric Utility Industry," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 14(8), pages 71-79, October.
    12. Jörg Borrmann & Gert Brunekreeft, 2010. "The Effect of Monopoly Regulation on the Timing of Investment," Bremen Energy Working Papers 0001, Bremen Energy Research.
    13. Brunekreeft, G. & Twelemann, S., 2005. "Regulation, Competition and Investment in the German Electricity Market: RegTP or REGTP," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0501, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    14. Paul L. Joskow, 1989. "Regulatory Failure, Regulatory Reform, and Structural Change in the Electrical Power Industry," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(1989 Micr), pages 125-208.
    15. Graeme Guthrie, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(4), pages 925-972, December.
    16. A. Michael Spence, 1975. "Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 417-429, Autumn.
    17. Ingo Vogelsang, 2010. "The Tension Between Incentive Regulation and Investments in Network Industries," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 8(03), pages 13-18, October.
    18. Carlo Cambini & Laura Rondi, 2010. "Incentive regulation and investment: evidence from European energy utilities," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 1-26, August.
    19. Grout, Paul A. & Zalewska, Anna, 2006. "The impact of regulation on market risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 149-184, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Roland Meyer & Gert Brunekreeft & Martin Palovic & Daniel Speiser, 2017. "Regulatorische Herausforderungen für Multi-Use-Speicher in Stromverteilnetzen – ein Ausschreibungsmodell," Bremen Energy Working Papers 0026, Bremen Energy Research.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Netzinfrastruktur; Energie; Monopol; Regulierung; Investitionen;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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