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“Peace-ful” Voting Procedures

Author

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  • Emerson Peter

    (The de Borda Institute – HQ, 36 Ballysillan Road, Belfast BT14 7QQ, UK)

Abstract

In conflict zones, the phrase, “The democratic process is a vital part of the peace process”, is often heard. Yet many voting procedures are far from “peace-ful”. Indeed, in many instances, divisive and adversarial voting procedures have not only failed to heal the dispute, they have in fact exacerbated the situation and, at worst, been the catalysts of violence.In the democratic process, voting may be used either (a) by the people (i) to make a decision in a referendum and (ii) to choose their representatives in local and general elections, and/or (b) by these representatives (i) when formulating policies and (ii) when electing a power-sharing administration and/or sub-committees. This article looks at all of these voting procedures: first in regard to the present situation; next with respect to those jurisdictions which have tried to use more inclusive methodologies; and thirdly, as part of a polity which at the very least could facilitate the resolution of conflicts and, at best, help to prevent any recurrence. In all three sections, it concludes by asking, and answering, the following question: Will consensus voting work?

Suggested Citation

  • Emerson Peter, 2013. "“Peace-ful” Voting Procedures," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(2), pages 249-273, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:19:y:2013:i:2:p:249-273:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/peps-2013-0010
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521516051, January.
    2. Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521731607, January.
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