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Contre-degustation Olympiades du Vin According to Borda

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  • Hulkower, Neal D.

Abstract

The rankings derived from the averages of points assigned by the judges of the red and white wines at the 1980 Contre-degustation Olympiades du Vin are compared to those determined using the Borda Count. For the white wines, Borda reversed the order of wines ranked second and third, and eleventh and twelfth by the averages. This put two California Chardonnays in the top two places and one in last place. For the red wines, Borda reversed the order of the two Burgundies in third and fourth place and breaks a tie in fifth place moving an Australian Pinot noir to sixth place behind a Burgundy. The difference in rankings is traced to the distortion caused by the wide spread of points awarded by the judges compared to the constant difference in the Borda Scores between non-tied adjacent alternatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Hulkower, Neal D., 2021. "Contre-degustation Olympiades du Vin According to Borda," Working Papers 321848, American Association of Wine Economists.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aawewp:321848
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.321848
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521516051, November.
    2. Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521731607, November.
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