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Sezessionsklauseln: Ein Instrument zur Förderung von Freiheit und Wohlstand?

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  • Apolte Thomas

    (Westfälische Wilhelms-UniversitätMünster, Centrum für Interdisziplinäre Wirtschaftsforschung, Germany)

Abstract

This paper studies the constitutional effects of secession clauses. We first explore the impact of secession clauses on the stability of a state constitution. We then take into account that secession clauses are collective rights rather than individual right. As a result, we find that secessions are not only associated with some potentially liberty-enhancing effects, but also with effects that may seriously undermine the basis of both individual freedom and prosperity. This notwithstanding, we have observed some historical cases of secession from totalitarian structures without which the ensuing foundation of a liberal constitution in the respective jurisdiction would have been impossible. However, the central states from which these jurisdictions split from considered the secession illegal, which rendered it impossible to base the secession on constitutionally guaranteed rights. Summing up, the main hypothesis of this paper is that secession clauses in authoritarian regimes are useless, while they are a potentially destabilizing as well as threatening to both individual freedom and prosperity in the case of a liberal society.

Suggested Citation

  • Apolte Thomas, 2018. "Sezessionsklauseln: Ein Instrument zur Förderung von Freiheit und Wohlstand?," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 69(1), pages 366-382, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:69:y:2018:i:1:p:366-382:n:16
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2019-0017
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sezessionsrechte; Theorie der Verfassung; Kollektive Entscheidungen;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H - Public Economics
    • P - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems

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