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Constitutional secession clauses

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Listed:
  • Yan Chen
  • Peter Ordeshook

Abstract

Taking the view that constitutions are devices whereby people coordinate to specific equilibria in circumstances that allow multiple equilibria, we show that a constitutional secession clause can serve as such a device and, therefore, that such a clause is more than an empty promise or an ineffectual threat. Employing a simple three-person recursive game, we establish that under certain conditions, this game possesses two equilibria—one in which a disadvantaged federal unit secedes and is not punished by the other units in the federation, and a second equilibrium in which this unit does not secede but is punished if it chooses to do so. Copyright George Mason University 1994

Suggested Citation

  • Yan Chen & Peter Ordeshook, 1994. "Constitutional secession clauses," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 45-60, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:5:y:1994:i:1:p:45-60
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02393255
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Apolte Thomas, 2018. "Sezessionsklauseln: Ein Instrument zur Förderung von Freiheit und Wohlstand?," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 69(1), pages 366-382, July.
    2. Alexander Salter, 2015. "Calhoun’s concurrent majority as a generality norm," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 375-390, September.
    3. Bordignon, Massimo & Brusco, Sandro, 2001. "Optimal secession rules," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1811-1834, December.
    4. Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Political bargaining in a federation: Buchanan meets Coase," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 983-999, October.
    5. Thomas Apolte, 1997. "Secession Clauses: A Tool for the Taming of an Arising Leviathan in Brussels?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 57-70, March.
    6. Leeson, Peter T. & Suarez, Paola A., 2016. "An economic analysis of Magna Carta," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(S), pages 40-46.
    7. Kumar, Vikas, 2011. "Negotiating constitutions for political unions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 58-76, March.
    8. Emerson Niou & Peter Ordeshook, 1998. "Alliances versus Federations: An Extension of Riker's Analysis of Federal Formation," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 271-288, December.
    9. Trent J. MacDonald, 2019. "The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 18871.
    10. Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009. "Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах [ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION OF POWER In the Federation]," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Political Bargaining in a Federation: Buchanan meets Coase," CEPR Discussion Papers 4188, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. ., 2019. "Economic theory of non-territorial unbundling," Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit, chapter 1, pages 14-38, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. M. Huysmans, 2018. "Enlargement and Exit:: The Origins of Article 50," Working Papers 18-09, Utrecht School of Economics.
    14. Martijn Huysmans & Christophe Crombez, 2020. "Making exit costly but efficient: the political economy of exit clauses and secession," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 89-110, March.
    15. Martijn Huysmans, 2019. "Enlargement and exit: The origins of Article 50," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(2), pages 155-175, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    D72;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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