Konstitutionelle Äquivalenz und Ordnungswahl

This paper attempts to broaden the conventional ambit of the ordo-liberal approach to comprise, in excess of the market sphere, also the political realm. How can the political process be structured so as to live up to the tenets of individuals’ sovereignty? This contribution suggests that constitutional equivalence holds if the same individuals that act at subnational level are also empowered to shape the rules relevant to them. The pattern and allocation of competences for framing social rules is vital for the realization of constitutional equivalence. The paradigm of the „state as monopolist“ is confronted with a form of decentralized problem solving that links the „geography of institutions“ with the „geography of problems“ and that puts the new decision makers in a position of institutional competitors. The exchange paradigm can be applied to all levels and modes of exchange: voluntary exchange on markets is only feasible if well defined property rights exist. By the same token, responsive policies, understood as complex forms of exchange, are only viable if the externalities are tackled by implementing well defined property rights and if the affected citizens receive group-exclusive, problem-adequate rights to convert their constitutional interests into institutions. An abstract four-layerstructure is proposed: 1. a general right of initiative for citizens on the national constitutional level, 2. an institutional meta-level where citizens’ specific rule-framing competencies are certified, 3. a constitutional level where empowered citizens shape the institutional framework of their society, 4. the sub-constitutional level where the playmakers choose their strategies for playing the game, within the limits set by the rules.