IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/jioedu/v1y2006i1n2.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Vertical Restraints Fundamentals for MBAs

Author

Listed:
  • Lafontaine Francine

Abstract

This lecture on vertical restraint is a transcript of a second-year MBA class at the Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan. At various points, student comments and comments by Valerie Suslow, the co-teacher of this course, appear. Accompanying this lecture are the PowerPoint slides and a few film clips from the lecture.The lecture begins with a discussion of vertical boundaries of the firm, and reasons why firms might want to vertically integrate. The bulk of the lecture, however, focuses on vertical restraints. After defining the different types of restraints found in manufacturer retailer contracts, the lecture covers the potential reasons - both efficiency and anti-competitive arguments - why these restraints are used. Finally, the lecture provides a short discussion of public policy towards these restraints, including their treatment under antitrust and various conflicting industry laws. This last section also contains a few examples of recent cases.

Suggested Citation

  • Lafontaine Francine, 2006. "Vertical Restraints Fundamentals for MBAs," Journal of Industrial Organization Education, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-30, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:jioedu:v:1:y:2006:i:1:n:2
    DOI: 10.2202/1935-5041.1001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-5041.1001
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2202/1935-5041.1001?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Blair,Roger D. & Lafontaine,Francine, 2011. "The Economics of Franchising," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521775892, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Nicola Gennaioli & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, 2015. "Optimally vague contracts and the law," Economics Working Papers 1410, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2017.
    2. Botti, Laurent & Briec, Walter & Cliquet, Gérard, 2009. "Plural forms versus franchise and company-owned systems: A DEA approach of hotel chain performance," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 566-578, June.
    3. Siyu Ma & Yair Tauman, 2021. "Licensing of a New Product Innovation with Risk Averse Agents," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 59(1), pages 79-102, August.
    4. González-Díaz, Manuel & Montoro-Sánchez, Ángeles, 2011. "Some lessons from incentive theory: Promoting quality in bus transport," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 299-306, March.
    5. Ying Fan & Kai-Uwe Kühn & Francine Lafontaine, 2017. "Financial Constraints and Moral Hazard: The Case of Franchising," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(6), pages 2082-2125.
    6. Odile Chanut & Gilles Paché, 2011. "Logistical " mutualization " in contractual networks: can the experience of the food retailing industry be reproduced?," Post-Print hal-01766899, HAL.
    7. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/26s2fhqla9901btt78qnrel14d is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Kunter, Marcus, 2012. "Coordination via cost and revenue sharing in manufacturer–retailer channels," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 216(2), pages 477-486.
    9. Bögenhold, Dieter & Fachinger, Uwe, 2012. "Unternehmertum: Unterschiedliche Facetten selbstständiger Berufstätigkeit [Entrepreneurship: Diverse aspects of self-employment]," MPRA Paper 51459, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Lømo, Teis Lunde, 2015. "Risk sharing mitigates opportunism in vertical contracting," Working Papers in Economics 10/15, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
    11. Magali Chaudey & Muriel Fadairo & Gwennaël Solard, 2011. "Sector-based explanation of vertical integration in distribution systems; Evidence from France," Working Papers 1136, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    12. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2008. "Competing for Ownership," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(6), pages 1279-1308, December.
    13. Rozenn Perrigot & Begoña López-Fernández & Guy Basset & Olivier Herrbach, 2020. "Resale pricing as part of franchisor know-how," Post-Print halshs-02566446, HAL.
    14. Délila Allam, 2008. "Les raisons d'être de la franchise dans les transactions de services aux entreprises," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00643798, HAL.
    15. Crosno, Jody L. & Tong, Pui Ying, 2018. "Just going through the motions? An empirical investigation of control, compliance, and performance in franchisor-franchisee relationships," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 360-373.
    16. James G. Combs & David J. Ketchen Jr & Jeremy C. Short, 2011. "Franchising Research: Major Milestones, New Directions, and its Future within Entrepreneurship," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 35(3), pages 413-425, May.
    17. Maruyama, Masayoshi & Yamashita, Yu, 2010. "The logic of franchise contracts: Empirical results of Japan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 183-192, August.
    18. Francine Lafontaine & Marek Zapletal & Xu Zhang, 2019. "Brighter prospects? Assessing the franchise advantage using census data," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 175-197, April.
    19. Cintya Lanchimba & Josef Windsperger & Muriel Fadairo, 2018. "Entrepreneurial orientation, risk and incentives: the case of franchising," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 163-180, January.
    20. Jaimovich, Nir, 2007. "Firm dynamics and markup variations: Implications for sunspot equilibria and endogenous economic fluctuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 300-325, November.
    21. Muriel Fadairo & Cyntia Lanchimba & Miguel Yangari, 2016. "Optimal Monetary Provisions and Risk Aversion in Plural Form Franchise Network. A Model of Incentives with Heterogeneous Agents," Working Papers 1602, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    vertical; restraints; antitrust;
    All these keywords.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:jioedu:v:1:y:2006:i:1:n:2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.