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Comment on "Family Values or Crony Capitalism?" (Harold James)

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  • Morck Randall

    (University of Alberta)

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  • Morck Randall, 2008. "Comment on "Family Values or Crony Capitalism?" (Harold James)," Capitalism and Society, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-7, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:capsoc:v:3:y:2008:i:1:n:2
    DOI: 10.2202/1932-0213.1034
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stein, Jeremy C, 1988. "Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 61-80, February.
    2. David Sraer & David Thesmar, 2007. "Performance and Behavior of Family Firms: Evidence from the French Stock Market," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(4), pages 709-751, June.
    3. Villalonga, Belen & Amit, Raphael, 2006. "How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 385-417, May.
    4. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    5. Mikkelson, Wayne H. & Partch, M. Megan, 1997. "The decline of takeovers and disciplinary managerial turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 205-228, May.
    6. Bronwyn H. Hall, 1993. "Industrial Research during the 1980s: Did the Rate of Return Fall?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(2 Microec), pages 289-343.
    7. Mueller, Holger & Philippon, Thomas, 2006. "Family Firms, Paternalism and Labour Relations," CEPR Discussion Papers 6017, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. McConnell, John J. & Muscarella, Chris J., 1985. "Corporate capital expenditure decisions and the market value of the firm," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 399-422, September.
    9. Kathy Fogel, 2006. "Oligarchic family control, social economic outcomes, and the quality of government," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 37(5), pages 603-622, September.
    10. Marianne Bertrand & Antoinette Schoar, 2006. "The Role of Family in Family Firms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 73-96, Spring.
    11. Mara Faccio, 2006. "Politically Connected Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March.
    12. repec:bla:jfinan:v:58:y:2003:i:3:p:1301-1327 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. repec:hoo:wpaper:e-93-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, 2003. "Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1301-1328, June.
    15. Randall K. Morck, 2005. "A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number morc05-1.
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