Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending
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DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1016
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Cited by:
- Jonathan Conning, 2005. "Monitoring by Peers or by Delegates? Joint Liability Loans and Moral Hazard," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 407, Hunter College Department of Economics.
- Ishida, Junichiro, 2009. "Incentives in academics: Collaboration under weak complementarities," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 215-223, April.
- Simon Cornée & David Masclet, 2013.
"Long-Term Relationships, Group lending and Peer Sanctioning in Microfinance: New Experimental Evidence,"
Working Papers CEB
13-026, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Simon Cornée & David Masclet, 2013. "Long-Term Relationships, Group lending and Peer Sanctioning in Microfinance: New Experimental Evidence," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201316, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Hisaki Kono, 2006.
"Is group lending a good enforcement scheme for achieving high repayment rates? Evidence from field experiments in vietnam,"
Artefactual Field Experiments
00075, The Field Experiments Website.
- Kono, Hisaki, 2006. "Is Group Lending A Good Enforcement Scheme for Achieving High Repayment Rates?: Evidence from Field Experiments in Vietnam," IDE Discussion Papers 61, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO).
- Joe Chen & Yun Jeong Choi & Yasuyuki Sawada, 2007. "Joint Liability Borrowing and Suicide," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-534, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Ahlin, Christian & Waters, Brian, 2016. "Dynamic microlending under adverse selection: Can it rival group lending?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 237-257.
- Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2006.
"Building an honest microfinance organization: Embezzlement and the optimality of rigid repayment schedules and joint liability,"
Economics Working Papers
893, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2015. "Building an Honest Microfinance Organization: Embezzlement and the Optimality of Rigid Repayment Schedules and Joint Liability," Working Papers 272, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Mohamed Salah Matoussi & Wided Mattoussi, 2010. "On the Design of Total Water Use-Based Incentive Schemes for Sustainable Groundwater Management," Working Papers 575, Economic Research Forum, revised 12 Jan 2010.
- Marx, Leslie M. & Squintani, Francesco, 2009.
"Individual accountability in teams,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 260-273, October.
- Leslie M. Marx & Francesco Squintani, 2002. "Individual Accountability in Teams," RCER Working Papers 494, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Paal, Beatrix & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Group insurance and lending with endogenous social collateral," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 30-40, January.
- Landeo, Claudia M. & Spier, Kathryn E., 2015.
"Incentive contracts for teams: Experimental evidence,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 496-511.
- Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2015. "Incentive Contracts for Teams: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 53, Peruvian Economic Association.
- Landeo, Claudia & Spier, Kathryn, 2015. "Incentive Contracts for Teams: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2015-9, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
- Wided Mattoussi & Paul Seabright, 2014.
"Cooperation against Theft: A Test of Incentives for Water Management in Tunisia,"
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 96(1), pages 124-153.
- Wided Mattoussi & Paul Seabright, 2009. "Cooperation Against Theft - A Test of Incentives for Water Management in Tunisia," Working Papers 491, Economic Research Forum, revised Jun 2009.
- Cornée, Simon & Masclet, David, 2022. "Long-term relationships, group lending, and peer monitoring in microfinance: Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
- Columba, Francesco & Gambacorta, Leonardo & Mistrulli, Paolo Emilio, 2010.
"Mutual guarantee institutions and small business finance,"
Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 45-54, April.
- Francesco Columba & Leonardo Gambacorta & Paolo Emilio Mistrulli, 2009. "Mutual guarantee institutions and small business finance," BIS Working Papers 290, Bank for International Settlements.
- Columba, F. & Gambacorta, L. & Mistrulli, P.E., 2009. "Mutual Guarantee Institutions and Small Business Finance," Other publications TiSEM e65f5fe5-994b-4e1b-92c1-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Francesco Columba & Leonardo Gambacorta & Paolo Emilio Mistrulli, 2009. "Mutual guarantee institutions and small business finance," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 735, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Columba, F. & Gambacorta, L. & Mistrulli, P.E., 2009. "Mutual Guarantee Institutions and Small Business Finance," Discussion Paper 2009-32 S, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Archawa Paweenawat, 2022. "Relative Performance Contracts versus Group Contracts with Hidden Savings," PIER Discussion Papers 176, Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research.
- Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2011.
"When is the optimal lending contract in microfinance state non-contingent?,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(5), pages 720-731, June.
- Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2010. "When Is the Optimal Lending Contract in Microfinance State Non-Contingent?," IDEI Working Papers 599, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2010. "When Is the Optimal Lending Contract in Microfinance State Non-Contingent?," TSE Working Papers 10-146, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Ahlin, Christian, 2015. "The role of group size in group lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 140-155.
- Alexander E. Saak, 2012.
"Collective Reputation, Social Norms, and Participation,"
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 94(3), pages 763-785.
- Saak, Alexander, 2011. "Collective reputation, social norms, and participation:," IFPRI discussion papers 1107, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- Hisaki KONO & Kazushi TAKAHASHI, 2010. "Microfinance Revolution: Its Effects, Innovations, And Challenges," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 48(1), pages 15-73, March.
- Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata & Maitra, Pushkar, 2012.
"Moral hazard and peer monitoring in a laboratory microfinance experiment,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 192-209.
- Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan & Pushkar Maitra, 2008. "Moral Hazard and Peer Monitoring in a Laboratory Microfinance Experiment," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1208, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Simtowe, Franklin & Zeller, Manfred, 2006. "Determinants of Moral Hazard in Microfinance: Empirical Evidence from Joint Liability Lending Programs in Malawi," MPRA Paper 461, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Simtowe, Franklin & Zeller, Manfred & Phiri, Alexander, 2006. "Determinants of Moral hazard in Microfinance: Empirical Evidence from Joint Liability Lending Schemes in Malawi," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25287, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Arghya Kusum Mukherjee & Amit Kundu, 2014. "Government-sponsored microfinance program: Joint liability vs. individual liability," Cogent Economics & Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(1), pages 1-14, December.
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Keywords
Group lending; free riding; and peer monitoring;All these keywords.
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