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Government-sponsored microfinance program: Joint liability vs. individual liability

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  • Arghya Kusum Mukherjee
  • Amit Kundu

Abstract

Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) is a government-sponsored microfinance program. The scheme is based on four features: group lending with joint liability, progressive lending, back-ended subsidy, and social capital. We propose a new model of SGSY having these features: group lending with individual liability, progressive lending, back-ended subsidy, and social capital. "Joint liability" clause of the existing model is replaced with individual liability in the new model. The paper shows that problem of adverse selection is removed in both models, i.e. in "SGSY with group lending and joint liability" and "SGSY with group lending and individual liability." The problem of "moral hazard" is more severe in the existing model of SGSY compared with the proposed model of SGSY. Borrowers are also benefitted from participation in the proposed scheme of SGSY than that in the existing model of SGSY.

Suggested Citation

  • Arghya Kusum Mukherjee & Amit Kundu, 2014. "Government-sponsored microfinance program: Joint liability vs. individual liability," Cogent Economics & Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(1), pages 1-14, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:oaefxx:doi:10.1080/23322039.2014.939768
    DOI: 10.1080/23322039.2014.939768
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    1. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1995. "Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-18, February.
    2. Ghatak, Maitreesh & Guinnane, Timothy W., 1999. "The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 195-228, October.
    3. Shubhashis Gangopadhyay & Maitreesh Ghatak & Robert Lensink, 2005. "Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 1005-1015, October.
    4. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    5. Che Yeon-Koo, 2002. "Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-28, July.
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