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Effective Scrappage Subsidies

Author

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  • Esteban Susanna

    (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, susanna.esteban@gmail.com)

Abstract

It is a common practice for governments to offer scrappage subsidies in order to stimulate the early removal of used cars and modify the distribution of vehicle holdings. In this paper, we analyze the market implications of such subsidies when producers have market power and face competition from a secondary used car market. One key result is that, with market power, a subsidy can induce scrappage even if it pays less than the price of a used car in the absence of the subsidy. We provide a full characterization of the effects of scrappage subsidies on primary and secondary markets for the case of a monopoly, and show that the subsidy that maximizes aggregate welfare lowers prices in the used car market. Our results contrast with the predictions derived from a model with perfect competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Esteban Susanna, 2007. "Effective Scrappage Subsidies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-32, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:9
    DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1200
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Miravete, Eugenio & Moral, Maria, 2009. "Qualitative Effects of Cash-For-Clunkers Programs," CEPR Discussion Papers 7517, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Chen, Jiawei & Esteban, Susanna & Shum, Matthew, 2010. "Do sales tax credits stimulate the automobile market?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 397-402, July.
    3. Keaton S. Miller & Wesley W. Wilson & Nicholas G. Wood, 2020. "Environmentalism, Stimulus, And Inequality Reduction Through Industrial Policy: Did Cash For Clunkers Achieve The Trifecta?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(3), pages 1109-1128, July.
    4. Selby, Brent & Kockelman, Kara M., 2012. "Microsimulating Automobile Markets: Evolution of Vehicle Holdings and Vehicle Pricing Dynamics," Journal of the Transportation Research Forum, Transportation Research Forum, vol. 51(2).
    5. Grigolon, Laura & Leheyda, Nina & Verboven, Frank, 2016. "Scrapping subsidies during the financial crisis — Evidence from Europe," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 41-59.
    6. Ashok Kaul & Gregor Pfeifer & Stefan Witte, 2012. "The incidence of Cash for Clunkers: an analysis of the 2009 car scrappage scheme in Germany," ECON - Working Papers 068, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    7. Cantos-Sánchez, Pedro & Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau, Eva & Mulalic, Ismir, 2018. "The impact of scrappage programmes on the demand for new vehicles: Evidence from Spain," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 83-96.

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