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Can reputation resolve the monetary policy credibility problem?

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  • al-Nowaihi, Ali
  • Levine, Paul

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  • al-Nowaihi, Ali & Levine, Paul, 1994. "Can reputation resolve the monetary policy credibility problem?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 355-380, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:33:y:1994:i:2:p:355-380
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    Cited by:

    1. Li, Jingyuan & Liu, Yongming & Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "A reputation strategic model of monetary policy in continuous-time," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 523-533, December.
    2. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, 2004. "Non-neutrality of monetary policy in policy games," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 695-707, September.
    3. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Libich, Jan, 2006. "Central Bank Independence, Accountability and Transparency: Complements or Strategic Substitutes?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5470, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Andres Velasco & Vincenzo Guzzo, 1998. "The Case for a Populist Banker," NBER Working Papers 6802, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Evans, Joanne & Levine, Paul & Trillas, Francesc, 2008. "Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-40, January.
    6. Mridula Duggal & Luis Rojas, 2023. "Optimal Disinflation with Delegation and Limited Credibility," Working Papers 1401, Barcelona School of Economics.
    7. SCHELLEKENS, Philip, 1999. "Optimal monetary policy delegation to conservative central banks," Working Papers 1999009, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    8. Jensen, Christian, 2016. "Discretion Rather than Rules? Binding Commitments versus Discretionary Policymaking," MPRA Paper 76838, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Levine, Paul & McAdam, Peter & Pearlman, Joseph, 2008. "Quantifying and sustaining welfare gains from monetary commitment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(7), pages 1253-1276, October.
    10. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2007. "Information Content of Wages and Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(1), pages 133-149, February.
    11. Wren-Lewis, Liam, 2013. "Commitment in utility regulation: A model of reputation and policy applications," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 210-231.
    12. Jensen Christian, 2020. "Discretion rather than rules? Outdated optimal commitment plans versus discretionary policymaking," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-9, January.
    13. Herrendorf, Berthold, 1998. "Inflation Targeting as a Way of Precommitment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 431-448, July.
    14. Ali al-Nowaihi & Dean Garratt, 1998. "The New Political Macroeconomics," Discussion Papers in Economics 98/05, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    15. Kobayashi, Teruyoshi, 2005. "A model of monetary unification under asymmetric information," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-15.
    16. Maa[beta], Henrich & Sell, Friedrich L., 1998. "Confident expectations, rational expectations and the optimal conduct of monetary policy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 519-541, October.
    17. Guzzo, Vincenzo & Velasco, Andres, 1999. "The case for a populist Central Banker," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1317-1344, June.
    18. Nikos Apergis & John Papanastasiou & Kostas Velentzas, 1997. "The credibility of policy announcements: Greek evidence," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(6), pages 699-705.
    19. Andrea Beccarini, 2017. "Verifying time inconsistency of the ECB monetary policy by means of a regime-switching approach," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 203-227, May.
    20. Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.

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