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Testing the Economic Model of Crime:The National Hockey League's Two-Referee Experiment

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  • Levitt Steven D.

    (University of Chicago Department of Economics)

Abstract

During the 1998-99 season, the National Hockey League randomly varied the number of referees used across games, seemingly providing a rare opportunity to test directly the deterrence model. Combining experimental parameter estimates with an economic model, there is little evidence that the rate of offending changed substantially with the addition of a second referee. The reason, however, appears to be that the second referee had little impact on the probability of punishment. As a consequence, the experiment ultimately turns out to be of limited use for testing deterrence.

Suggested Citation

  • Levitt Steven D., 2002. "Testing the Economic Model of Crime:The National Hockey League's Two-Referee Experiment," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-21, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:contributions.1:y:2002:i:1:n:2
    DOI: 10.2202/1538-0645.1014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Julio del Corral & Juan Prieto-Rodríguez & Rob Simmons, 2010. "The Effect of Incentives on Sabotage: The Case of Spanish Football," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 11(3), pages 243-260, June.
    3. Edward Miguel & Sebastián M. Saiegh & Shanker Satyanath, 2008. "National Cultures and Soccer Violence," NBER Working Papers 13968, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Chan, Ho Fai & Savage, David A. & Torgler, Benno, 2019. "There and back again: Adaptation after repeated rule changes of the game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 75(PB).
    5. Abrevaya Jason & McCulloch Robert, 2014. "Reversal of fortune: a statistical analysis of penalty calls in the National Hockey League," Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 207-224, June.
    6. Dietl Helmut M & Duschl Tobias & Lang Markus, 2011. "Executive Pay Regulation: What Regulators, Shareholders, and Managers Can Learn from Major Sports Leagues," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 1-32, August.
    7. Gregory DeAngelo & Adam Nowak & Imke Reimers, 2018. "Examining Regulatory Capture: Evidence From The Nhl," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(1), pages 183-191, January.
    8. Carl Kitchens, 2014. "Identifying Changes In The Spatial Distribution Of Crime: Evidence From A Referee Experiment In The National Football League," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(1), pages 259-268, January.
    9. Thomas Dohmen & Jan Sauermann, 2016. "Referee Bias," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 679-695, September.
    10. Ivan Trestcov, 2022. "Compliance Behavior under Surveillance: Introduction of the Video Assistant Referee to European Football," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp733, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    11. Carl Kitchens & Matthew Philip Makofske & Le Wang, 2019. "“Crime” on the Field," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 85(3), pages 821-864, January.
    12. Kevin P. Hutchinson & Andrew J. Yates, 2007. "Crime on the Court: A Correction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(3), pages 515-519.
    13. repec:zbw:rwirep:0047 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Babatunde Buraimo & David Forrest & Robert Simmons, 2007. "The Twelfth Man? Refereeing Bias in English and German Soccer," Working Papers 0707, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists.
    15. George F. N. Shoukry, 2016. "Criminals' Response To Changing Crime Lucre," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(3), pages 1464-1483, July.
    16. Taylor P. Stevenson & Robert D. Tollison & Dennis Pearson, 2012. "Efficacy of shaming penalties: Evidence from SEC football," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(2), pages 1162-1170.
    17. Radek Janhuba & Kristyna Cechova, 2017. "Criminals on the Field: A Study of College Football," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp610, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    18. Haisken-DeNew, John P. & Vorell, Matthias, 2008. "Blood Money: Incentives for Violence in NHL Hockey," Ruhr Economic Papers 47, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    19. Nieken, Petra & Stegh, Michael, 2010. "Incentive Effects in Asymmetric Tournaments Empirical Evidence from the German Hockey League," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 305, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    20. John P. Haisken-DeNew & Matthias Vorell, 2008. "Blood Money: Incentives for Violence in NHL Hockey," Ruhr Economic Papers 0047, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    21. W. David Allen, 2005. "Cultures of Illegality in the National Hockey League," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 71(3), pages 494-513, January.
    22. Craig A. Depken & Peter A. Groothuis & Mark C. Strazicich, 2020. "Evolution Of Community Deterrence: Evidence From The National Hockey League," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(2), pages 289-303, April.

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