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Separating Equilibria in Public Auctions

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  • Gavious Arieh

    (Ben Gurion University)

Abstract

We consider two private-value auctions where the prize in one is higher than the prize in the other. We show that a separating equilibrium exists in which bidders with a high valuation attend the auction with the higher prize while bidders with a low valuation attend the auction with the lower prize. In addition, we prove that a weak separating equilibrium exists where the strong bidders attend the high prize auction while the weak bidders randomize and may attend either auction, although with a higher probability of attending the low prize auction. In the set of auctions with separating equilibrium, we find the optimal minimum bids that maximize a seller's expected revenue.

Suggested Citation

  • Gavious Arieh, 2009. "Separating Equilibria in Public Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-19, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:37
    DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.2183
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 1997. "Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 141-179, July.
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    6. Burguet, Roberto & Sakovics, Jozsef, 1999. "Imperfect Competition in Auction Designs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 231-247, February.
    7. Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2005. "Competition among auctioneers in large markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 107-127, March.
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    Cited by:

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