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Entry into a Network Industry: Consumers' Expectations and Firms' Pricing Policies

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  • Baglioni Angelo

    (Catholic University Milan)

Abstract

Entry into a network industry is modeled focusing on consumers' expectations formation through higher order beliefs. Equilibrium expectations are endogenous and depend on prices, acting as a coordination device among consumers. The model is able to account for aggressive pricing policies by the incumbent and by the entrant. Both exclusion and entry are possible outcomes (depending on parameter values). The threat of entry is beneficial to consumers, even when unsuccessful.

Suggested Citation

  • Baglioni Angelo, 2008. "Entry into a Network Industry: Consumers' Expectations and Firms' Pricing Policies," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-13, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:8:y:2008:i:1:n:23
    DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.2012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Csorba, Gergely, 2008. "Contracting with asymmetric information in the presence of positive network effects: Screening and divide-and-conquer techniques," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 54-66, March.
    3. Angelo Baglioni, 2006. "Entry into a network industry: consumers’ expectations and firms’ pricing policies," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief69, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    4. Giuseppe Mastromatteo, 2011. "H.P. Minsky And Policies To Countervail Crises," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0102, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    5. Maria Flavia Ambrosanio & Massimo Bordignon & Floriana Cerniglia, 2010. "Constitutional Reforms, Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Fiscal Flows in Italy," Chapters, in: Núria Bosch & Marta Espasa & Albert Solé Ollé (ed.), The Political Economy of Inter-Regional Fiscal Flows, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Luca Colombo & Herbert Dawid & Kordian Kabus, 2012. "When do thick venture capital markets foster innovation? An evolutionary analysis," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 79-108, January.
    7. Stefano Colombo, 2008. "Discriminatory prices, endogenous locations and the Prisoner Dilemma problem," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0079, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    8. Giuseppe Mastromatteo, 2011. "The Debate on the Crisis: Recent Reappraisals of the Concept of Functional Finance," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0105, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    9. Baglioni, Angelo & Monticini, Andrea, 2010. "The intraday interest rate under a liquidity crisis: The case of August 2007," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 198-200, May.

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