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Parental Transfers, Intra-household Bargaining and Fertility Decision

Author

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  • Gahramanov Emin

    (Economics, American University of Sharjah, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates)

  • Gaibulloev Khusrav

    (Economics, American University of Sharjah, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates)

  • Younas Javed

    (Economics, American University of Sharjah, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates)

Abstract

This paper examines the role of parental transfers on family size. We introduce a simple theoretical model of fertility decision where preferences towards children may differ between female and male spouses. Parental transfers increase both the household income and the bargaining power of the recipient spouse. Therefore, transfers from wife’s and husband’s parents may have dissimilar effects on the number of children. Our empirical result, based on a unique household-level data for Japan, supports this hypothesis. In particular, received transfers from the wife’s parents are negatively associated with the demand for children. In contrast, both received and expected transfers from the husband’s parents are positively associated with the demand for children. These results hold important policy implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Gahramanov Emin & Gaibulloev Khusrav & Younas Javed, 2019. "Parental Transfers, Intra-household Bargaining and Fertility Decision," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 1-17, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:19:y:2019:i:1:p:17:n:8
    DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2018-0118
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    family size; fertility; parental transfers; bargaining power; collective framework; quantity-quality model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth

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