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Lobbying as a Guard against Extremism

Author

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  • Zudenkova Galina

    (Department of Economics, University of Mannheim, D-68131Mannheim, Germany)

Abstract

This paper analyzes endogenous lobbying over a unidimensional policy issue. Individuals differ in policy preferences and decide either to take part in lobbying activities or not. They are assumed to be group rule-utilitarian such that they follow the rule that, if followed by everyone else in their special interest group, would maximize their group’s aggregate welfare. Once formed, lobbies make contributions to the incumbent government in exchange for a policy favor as in a common-agency model. I show the existence of equilibrium with two organized lobbies. Individuals with more extreme preferences are more likely to join lobbying activities. Therefore, the lobbyists are rather extremists than moderates. However, the competition between those extreme lobbies results in a more moderate policy outcome relative to that initially preferred by the biased government. Lobbies therefore guard against extremism, while acting as moderators of the government’s preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Zudenkova Galina, 2017. "Lobbying as a Guard against Extremism," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-17, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:17:y:2017:i:1:p:17:n:11
    DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2016-0212
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    Cited by:

    1. Jennifer Abel-Koch, 2013. "Endogenous Trade Policy with Heterogeneous Firms," Working Papers 1306, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, revised 01 Aug 2013.
    2. Daisuke Hirata & Yuichiro Kamada, 2020. "Extreme donors and policy convergence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(1), pages 149-176, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    common agency; endogenous lobbying; extremism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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