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Incentive Effects of Parents’ Transfers to Children: An Artefactual Field Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Sinan Unur A.

    (Cornell University, 710 Giles St Apt 6, Ithaca, NY 14850)

  • Peters Elizabeth

    (University of Delaware, Newark, DE, USA)

  • Messer Kent D.

    (Urban Institute, Washington, DC)

  • Schulze William D.

    (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY)

Abstract

The standard altruism model within the family predicts that transfers will be inversely related to the recipient’s income. Thus, parents will implicitly insure children against bad luck. This insurance may cause children to take undesirable risks. Anticipating this moral hazard, parents may alter their transfers. Using an artefactual field experiment, we show that parents use transfers to compensate for differences between their teenage children when incomes are independent of children’s actions. However, when a potential incentive problem is introduced, parents generally move away from compensating transfers. In addition, we find that the teenage children are more likely to take unfair bets when their behavior is not detectable by their parents.

Suggested Citation

  • Sinan Unur A. & Peters Elizabeth & Messer Kent D. & Schulze William D., 2013. "Incentive Effects of Parents’ Transfers to Children: An Artefactual Field Experiment," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 73-106, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:13:y:2013:i:1:p:73-106:n:1
    DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2012-0001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    family economics; moral hazard; artefactual field experiment; intergenerational transfers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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