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Factors Influencing Governors' Salaries, 1961-2001

Author

Listed:
  • Tuttle Markland

    (Sam Houston State University)

  • Bumpass Donald

    (Sam Houston State University)

Abstract

This paper examines the determinants of governors' salaries for the forty-eight contiguous states. State budgetary variables, personal income, population, unemployment rate and state government employment are the primary determinants of governors' compensation. There appears to be a large amount of convergence among salaries over the forty year sample period; the states with lower pay in 1961 experienced faster growth in their governor's compensation. Thus, findings support the view that a governor's pay is based primarily on the responsibility measured by the economic size of the state and the size of a state's government.

Suggested Citation

  • Tuttle Markland & Bumpass Donald, 2010. "Factors Influencing Governors' Salaries, 1961-2001," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-20, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:34
    DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.1542
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Di Tella, Rafael & Fisman, Raymond, 2004. "Are Politicians Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(2), pages 477-513, October.
    2. W. Crain & Robert Tollison, 1976. "State budget sizes and the marginal productivity of governors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 91-96, September.
    3. R. Hafer, 1977. "State budget sizes and the marginal productivity of governors: An extension," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 143-149, December.
    4. Sen, Pradyot K, 1991. "Evidence of Work Related and Incentive Payments in Gubernatorial Pay," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 71(1-2), pages 89-100, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Karsten Mause, 2014. "Self-serving legislators? An analysis of the salary-setting institutions of 27 EU parliaments," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 154-176, June.

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    Keywords

    governors’ salaries;

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