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State budget sizes and the marginal productivity of governors: An extension

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  • R. Hafer

Abstract

An improved specification of the model used by C-T reveals that governors in those states where constitutional methods are used to determine gubernatorial compensation may have greater incentives to expand their respective state budget and, in doing so, increase their pay. The additional evidence offered in this paper suggests that such uses of discretionary power may be negligible or effectively blocked by competing groups. Thus, employing a more rigorous testing of the applicability of marginal productivity theory to the determination of gubernatiorial compensation supports the C-T contention that governors' pay may be determined in ways quite similar to those of comparable private factor markets, viz., by the competitive process. Copyright Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Instutute and State University 1977

Suggested Citation

  • R. Hafer, 1977. "State budget sizes and the marginal productivity of governors: An extension," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 143-149, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:32:y:1977:i:1:p:143-149
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718677
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    Cited by:

    1. Tuttle Markland & Bumpass Donald, 2010. "Factors Influencing Governors' Salaries, 1961-2001," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-20, April.
    2. Karsten Mause, 2014. "Self-serving legislators? An analysis of the salary-setting institutions of 27 EU parliaments," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 154-176, June.

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