IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/apjrin/v13y2019i1p16n1.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Who Estimates When It’s Not Required? the Case of Subrogation

Author

Listed:
  • Ames Daniel

    (Bryant University College of Business, Smithfield, Rhode Island, USA)

  • Graden Bryan S.

    (Assistant Professor of Accounting, Southern Utah University, 351 W. University Blvd, Cedar, United States of America)

  • Sankara Jomo

    (Associate Professor of Accounting, Illinois State University, Campus Box 5520, IL 61790-5520, Normal, United States of America)

Abstract

The ability of an insurer to pursue and collect money from responsible third parties for paid claims is referred to as subrogation. For some insurers, the amount to be recovered may be significant and, if accrued for, represents an estimate that could be used by management to affect earnings. This study investigates factors associated with insurers’ choice to accrue subrogation for statutory accounting. For statutory accounting, where insurers can choose whether to accrue subrogation or exclude it as an offset to the claims liability, we find that publicly-traded (mutually-owned) insurers are significantly more (less) likely to accrue subrogation than privately-owned insurers. In addition, we find that publicly-traded (mutual) insurers with weak ratings are less (more) likely to accrue subrogation. Finally, we find that insurers with large amounts of subrogation are more likely to accrue subrogation, consistent with these types of insurers having the strongest incentive to influence earnings through the subrogation accrual. Our results provide evidence suggesting that insurers respond to their incentives when choosing whether to accrue subrogation for statutory reporting.

Suggested Citation

  • Ames Daniel & Graden Bryan S. & Sankara Jomo, 2019. "Who Estimates When It’s Not Required? the Case of Subrogation," Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-16, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:apjrin:v:13:y:2019:i:1:p:16:n:1
    DOI: 10.1515/apjri-2017-0028
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/apjri-2017-0028
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/apjri-2017-0028?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Petroni, Kathy Ruby, 1992. "Optimistic reporting in the property- casualty insurance industry," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 485-508, December.
    2. Beaver, William H. & McNichols, Maureen F. & Nelson, Karen K., 2003. "Management of the loss reserve accrual and the distribution of earnings in the property-casualty insurance industry," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 347-376, August.
    3. Gaver, Jennifer J. & Paterson, Jeffrey S., 2004. "Do insurers manipulate loss reserves to mask solvency problems?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 393-416, September.
    4. Yu-Luen Ma & Yayuan Ren, 2012. "Do Publicly Traded Property–Casualty Insurers Cater to the Stock Market?," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 79(2), pages 415-430, June.
    5. Abarbanell, Jeffery & Lehavy, Reuven, 2003. "Biased forecasts or biased earnings? The role of reported earnings in explaining apparent bias and over/underreaction in analysts' earnings forecasts," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-3), pages 105-146, December.
    6. Martin F. Grace & J. Tyler Leverty, 2012. "Property–Liability Insurer Reserve Error: Motive, Manipulation, or Mistake," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 79(2), pages 351-380, June.
    7. Daniel Ames & Bryan Graden & Jomo Sankara, 2017. "Estimation Errors Among Insurers: The Case of Subrogation," Journal of Insurance Issues, Western Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 40(2), pages 159-180.
    8. Mayers, David & Smith, Clifford W, Jr, 1988. "Ownership Structure across Lines of Property-Casualty Insurance," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 351-378, October.
    9. Burgstahler, David & Dichev, Ilia, 1997. "Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 99-126, December.
    10. Cohen, Daniel A. & Zarowin, Paul, 2010. "Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 2-19, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Boyer, M. Martin & Cowins, Elicia P. & Reddic, Willie D., 2019. "Portfolio rebalancing behavior with operating losses and investment regulation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 313-328.
    2. M. Martin Boyer & Elijah Brewer & Willie Reddic, 2019. "The Association between Complexity and Managerial Discretion in the Property and Casualty Insurance Industry," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(03), pages 1-33, September.
    3. Han, Sangyong & Lai, Gene C. & Ho, Chia-Ling, 2018. "Corporate transparency and reserve management: Evidence from US property-liability insurance companies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 379-392.
    4. Jiang Cheng & Mary A. Weiss, 2012. "The Role of RBC, Hurricane Exposure, Bond Portfolio Duration, and Macroeconomic and Industry-wide Factors in Property–Liability Insolvency Prediction," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 79(3), pages 723-750, September.
    5. Yi-hsun Lai & Wen-chang Lin & Liang-wei Kuo, 2018. "Forestalling capital regulation or masking financial weakness? Evidence from loss reserve management in the property–liability insurance industry," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 481-518, February.
    6. Fiordelisi, Franco & Meles, Antonio & Monferrà, Stefano & Starita, Maria Grazia, 2013. "Personal vs. Corporate Goals: Why do Insurance Companies Manage Loss Reserves?," MPRA Paper 47867, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Kexing Ding & Baruch Lev & Xuan Peng & Ting Sun & Miklos A. Vasarhelyi, 2020. "Machine learning improves accounting estimates: evidence from insurance payments," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 1098-1134, September.
    8. Kai Wang & Lei Fang & Jiang Cheng, 2020. "Management of commissions to meet the regulatory requirements: the case of property–casualty insurance in China," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 45(3), pages 508-534, July.
    9. Hung, Jessica & Chang, Vincent Y. L., 2018. "The analysis of capital structure for propertyliability insurers: A quantile regression approach," Business and Economic Horizons (BEH), Prague Development Center, vol. 14(4), pages 829-850, August.
    10. Fang Sun & Xiangjing Wei, 2019. "Property-Liability Insurers’ Discretionary and Nondiscretionary Loss Reserve Error: Relation with Investor Sentiment," Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies (RPBFMP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 22(03), pages 1-20, September.
    11. Jiang Cheng & J. David Cummins & Tzuting Lin, 2021. "Earnings management surrounding forced CEO turnover: evidence from the U.S. property-casualty insurance industry," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 819-847, April.
    12. Jill Bisco & Kathleen McCullough & Hugo Moises Montesinos Yufa & Eleanor Tice Sirmans, 2023. "The impact of monitor choice on insurer loss reserves," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 26(1), pages 83-105, March.
    13. Enya He & David W. Sommer, 2010. "Separation of Ownership and Control: Implications for Board Composition," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(2), pages 265-295, June.
    14. Martin F. Grace & J. Tyler Leverty, 2010. "Political Cost Incentives for Managing the Property‐Liability Insurer Loss Reserve," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1), pages 21-49, March.
    15. Gaganis, Chrysovalantis & Hasan, Iftekhar & Pasiouras, Fotios, 2016. "Regulations, institutions and income smoothing by managing technical reserves: International evidence from the insurance industry," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 59(PA), pages 113-129.
    16. Steven W. Pottier & David W. Sommer, 2006. "Opaqueness in the Insurance Industry: Why Are Some Insurers Harder to Evaluate than Others?," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 9(2), pages 149-163, September.
    17. David L. Eckles & Martin Halek, 2010. "Insurer Reserve Error and Executive Compensation," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(2), pages 329-346, June.
    18. Gaver, Jennifer J. & Paterson, Jeffrey S., 2004. "Do insurers manipulate loss reserves to mask solvency problems?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 393-416, September.
    19. Sun, Zeyu & Kong, Ningning & Wu, Lei & Bao, Yu, 2024. "Does contingent payment in M&As induce acquirers’ earnings management? Evidence from performance commitment," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    20. Ege, Matthew S. & Stuber, Sarah B., 2022. "Are auditors rewarded for low audit quality? The case of auditor lenience in the insurance industry," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:apjrin:v:13:y:2019:i:1:p:16:n:1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.