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The Utility Of Economic Sanctions In View Of Coercive Characteristics Towards Prosperity And Security

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  • Mark Raymond ULMER

    (Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, International Economics and Marketing, Kyiv, Ukraine)

Abstract

Research involving the utility of economic sanctions introduces misrepresentations and if categorized would include: ignoring comparisons of economic sanctions with coercive alternatives, analyzing economic sanctions as a substitute to hard force exclusively, and redefining the uses of economic sanctions for political purposes. We present a definition of economic sanctions and show the sequence of power as it may be imposed across a spectrum at various intensities relative to characteristics. We analyze how characteristics between power groups are diffuse and that conclusions involving utility are insignificant without analyzing variance within power strata. We’ve categorized characteristics into two groups that are inversely positioned and regressed on a power interval: characteristics of prosperity (target size, intervention, predictability, attractiveness, efficiency, and communication) and characteristics of security (clarity, rate, return, control, risk, costs, and violence). We illustrate that as prosperity increase or decrease the security characteristics decrease or increase respectively as inverse substitutes.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Raymond ULMER, 2019. "The Utility Of Economic Sanctions In View Of Coercive Characteristics Towards Prosperity And Security," Management of Sustainable Development, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Faculty of Economic Sciences, vol. 11(2), pages 1-9, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:blg:msudev:v:11:y:2019:i:2:p:5-13
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2009. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition (paper)," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4129, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coercion; utility; hard power; characteristics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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