IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/socsci/v105y2024i4p1140-1151.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Shaking the tin cup: Celebrity candidate fundraising in American elections

Author

Listed:
  • Richard T. Longoria

Abstract

Background The literature on celebrity politics often asserts that celebrity politicians are good at fundraising. They are wealthy people in wealthy social networks, and this should give them a fundraising advantage compared to their noncelebrity opponents. Yet, this hypothesis has never been tested. Method Fundraising data from 1964 to 2022 was collected from multiple sources. Results This study finds that celebrity candidates are typically not able to out‐fundraise their opponents. Yet they perform remarkably well despite this disadvantage. Conclusions Celebrities tend to win elections when they raise more money than their opponents, run in open‐seat contests or local elections. They tend to lose elections when they lose the fundraising battle, challenge incumbents, or seek federal offices.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard T. Longoria, 2024. "Shaking the tin cup: Celebrity candidate fundraising in American elections," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 105(4), pages 1140-1151, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:105:y:2024:i:4:p:1140-1151
    DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.13403
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13403
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/ssqu.13403?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary Jacobson, 1985. "Money and votes reconsidered: congressional elections, 1972–1982," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 7-62, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Julia Cage & Edgard Dewitte, 2021. "It Takes Money to Make MPs: Evidence from 150 Years of British Campaign Spending," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03384143, HAL.
    2. Julia Cage & Edgard Dewitte, 2021. "It Takes Money to Make MPs: Evidence from 150 Years of British Campaign Spending," SciencePo Working papers hal-03384143, HAL.
    3. Julia Cage & Yasmine Bekkouche, 2018. "The Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," Working Papers hal-03393149, HAL.
    4. Bekkouche, Yasmine & Cagé, Julia & Dewitte, Edgard, 2022. "The heterogeneous price of a vote: Evidence from multiparty systems, 1993–2017," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    5. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1dp7827s4n8ht8fk3qhmeuvd0o is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Gerald Keim & Asghar Zardkoohi, 1988. "Looking for leverage in PAC markets: Corporate and labor contributions considered," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 21-34, July.
    7. Kenneth Benoit & Michael Marsh, 2008. "The Campaign Value of Incumbency: A New Solution to the Puzzle of Less Effective Incumbent Spending," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(4), pages 874-890, October.
    8. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira & Allan Drazen, 2024. "A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(662), pages 2351-2390.
    9. Franklin Mixon, Jr. & Steven Caudill & Christopher Duquette, 2008. "The impact of money on elections: evidence from open seat races in the United States House of Representatives, 1990-2004," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(2), pages 1-12.
    10. Prat, Andrea, 2002. "Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 162-189, March.
    11. Köppl-Turyna, Monika, 2014. "Campaign finance regulations and policy convergence: The role of interest groups and valence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 1-19.
    12. Bekkouche, Yasmine & Cagé, Julia & Dewitte, Edgard, 2022. "The heterogeneous price of a vote: Evidence from multiparty systems, 1993–2017," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    13. Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage, 2019. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03393084, HAL.
    14. Matthew T. Cole & Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2018. "Incumbency Advantage in an Electoral Contest," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 49(4), pages 419-436.
    15. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/2ahul47tb09rvqfl9eelv7o5ca is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Yogesh Uppal, 2010. "Estimating Incumbency Effects In U.S. State Legislatures: A Quasi‐Experimental Study," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(2), pages 180-199, July.
    17. Julia Cage & Yasmine Bekkouche, 2018. "The Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03393149, HAL.
    18. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    19. Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage & Edgard Dewitte, 2022. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from Multiparty Systems, 1993-2017," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03389172, HAL.
    20. Jeffrey Milyo, 2013. "Campaign Spending and Electoral Competition: Towards More Policy Relevant Research," Working Papers 1311, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    21. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/7rcgbs4v788terphdvb6a5e8t8 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/10lirmbd5p8h4ae52oi51b4cka is not listed on IDEAS
    23. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/1dp7827s4n8ht8fk3qhmeuvd0o is not listed on IDEAS
    24. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2ahul47tb09rvqfl9eelv7o5ca is not listed on IDEAS
    25. Cagé, Julia & Bekkouche, Yasmine, 2018. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," CEPR Discussion Papers 12614, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    26. Susan A. Edelman, 1992. "Two Politicians, A Pac, And How They Interact: Two Extensive Form Games," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 289-306, November.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:105:y:2024:i:4:p:1140-1151. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0038-4941 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.