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Trust, institutional quality, and the protection of property rights: A cross‐regional study of East Asia and Western countries

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  • Kee Hoon Chung
  • Hyeok Yong Kwon

Abstract

Objective This article explores the conditions under which social trust enhances institutional performance, specifically the protection of property rights in Western versus East Asian countries over time. Methods We estimate fixed‐effects panel regression models to test how the relationship between trust and property rights protection is moderated by the quality of political institutions, including state capacity, the legal system, and democracy. Results We find that the relationship between social trust and property rights protection is contingent on the quality of political institutions across regions. The quality of the legal system exerts the most pronounced and contrasting effect on the link between social trust and property rights protection in Western and East Asian countries, while the conditional effects of state capacity and democracy are comparatively less pronounced in both regions. Conclusion This study contributes valuable insights into the complex interplay between social trust and institutional outcomes in diverse societal contexts.

Suggested Citation

  • Kee Hoon Chung & Hyeok Yong Kwon, 2024. "Trust, institutional quality, and the protection of property rights: A cross‐regional study of East Asia and Western countries," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 105(2), pages 267-280, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:105:y:2024:i:2:p:267-280
    DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.13340
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